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INTRODUCTION

Late in the fall of 2006, the city of Atlanta
Atlanta exploded
exploded in outrage
when Kathryn Johnston, a ninety-two-year
ninety-two-year old woman, died in a
team.'1 The police used a "noshoot-out with a police narcotics team.
knock" search warrant
warrant to break
break into Johnston's
Johnston's home unannounced.
unannounced.22
old
Unfortunately
Unfortunately for everyone
everyone involved, Ms. Johnston kept an old
revolver for self defense-not
defense-not a bad strategy
strategy in a neighborhood with
recently
a thriving drug trade and where another elderly woman was recently
being
robbed,
Johnston
managed
thinking
she
was
raped.33 Probably
Probably
"volley of
of
to fire once before
before the police overwhelmed her with a "volley
4
4
thirty-nine" shots, five or six of which proved
thirty-nine"
proved fatal.
fata1. The raid and its
aftermath appalled the nation, especially
aftermath
especially when a federal investigation
investigation
exposed the lies and corruption
corruption leading
leading to the incident. 55 But buried
misconduct lies an interesting legal question.
beneath all the blatant
blatant misconduct
Assuming that the no-knock
no-knock warrant was valid, did Ms. Johnston
Johnston
Law. Thanks
Professor Russell
Russell
Georgia State
State University
College of
J.D. Candidate,
Candidate, 2010,
2010, Georgia
* J.D.
University College
of Law.
Thanks to
to Professor
Covey, Mr. Doug Ramseur, and the Law
Law Review editors for their valuable suggestions and insight. Any
deficiencies are the author's own.
deficiencies
5, 2008,
Raid, Death,
Death, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
J.-CONST., May 5,
1. Steve Visser, Coun
CourtFocuses
1.
Focuses on Botched Raid,
2008, at BI,
Bl,
also Patrik Jonsson, After Atlanta Raid Tragedy,
Tragedy, New Scrutiny
availableat
at 2008 WLNR 8347479; see also
available
WarrantsAfter an
an Octogenarian
Octogenarian Was
Use of "No-Knock" Warrants
of Police
Tactics: Police
Police Tactics:
Police Are Reviewing Their Use
availableat
Killed After Officers Burst into Her
Killed
Her Home, CHRISTIAN
CHRISTIAN SC.
SCI. MONITOR,
MONITOR, Nov. 29, 2006, at 3, available
2006 WLNR 20583600.
1.A no-knock warrant allows the police to enter a suspect's home without
2. Jonsson,
Jonsson, supra
supra note 1.
knocking
knocking or otherwise
otherwise announcing
announcing themselves. See discussion
discussion infra
infra Part I.A.
LA.
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
PoliceKill Woman,
Woman, 92,
92, in Shootout at
at Her
3.
Her Home,
23, 2006,
3. Brenda Goodman, Police
available
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/l l/23/us/23atlanta.html.
available at http://www.nytimes.coml2006/11123/usl23atlanta.html.
MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL (Tenn.),
4. Walter
Newsmaker-Prison Time for Botched Raid,
Walter Putnam, Newsmaker-Prison
Raid, MEMPIDS
May 23,
23, 2008, at A2, available
available at 2008 WLNR 9804037.
31, 2008, at Cl,
J.-CONST., Oct. 31,
5. Bill Rankin, Plea
Plea in Botched
BotchedRaid Ends Feds' Case,
5.
Case, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
at 2008
available
available at
2008 WLNR
WLNR 20770526. The police lied to the judge
judge to obtain a no-knock
no-knock warrant and then
also Bill Torpy, Senseless
planted
supra note 1;
1; see also
planted drugs in Johnston's
Johnston's house to justify
justify the raid. Visser, supra
at 2008
available at
Shadow on Police,
Killing Still Casts
Casts Shadow
Police, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
J.-CONST., Nov. 9, 2008, at D3, available
WLNR
WLNR 21418601.
21418601.
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have a right to shoot at the police officers who broke through her
have
door looking for drugs? Would
Would she have
have been
been guilty of
door
of murder and
possibly sentenced to death if her shot had actually hit and killed a
police officer?
law is far from clear, in reality "when it's a cop who
Although the law
gets
shot,
gets shot, the private citizen nearly always winds up in jail.,,6
jail."6 Take
2001, Maye
the story of Cory Maye, for example. Late one night in 2001,
"awoke
7
to
a
furious
pounding
on
his
front door.,,7
door." Afraid for his and
"awoke to a furious pounding on his front
his daughter's safety, Maye rushed to the bedroom where his
daughter slept, retrieved a gun he kept for self-defense, and lay down
on the floor hoping the intruders would go away. 88 When a figure
burst through the bedroom door, Maye fired three times out of fright. 99
Unfortunately
Unfortunately for Maye, the intruders turned out to be police
executing a no-knock warrant, and one of Maye's bullets hit an
10 Maye was convicted
officer in the stomach, killing him.
him.1O
convicted of capital
murder, sentenced
sentenced to death, and put on death row in a Mississippi
Mississippi
•
11
prison.
pnson. 11
of
In another
another case, an Arkansas
Arkansas SWAT team stormed the house of
Tracy Ingle, who, thinking that robbers were invading his home,
waved
police responded
responded
waved a non-functioning
non-functioning pistol
pistol at the officers. 1122 The police
1
3
with an overwhelming
overwhelming hail of gunfire. I3 Ingle was shot five times,
with one bullet destroying his femur and leaving
"dangling
leaving his leg "dangling
from his body, connected
connected only by a bloody
bloody mess
mess of meat, skin[,]
skin[,] and
and
6.
6. Statement
Statement by
by Radley
Radley Balko
Balko quoted
quoted by David
David Koon,
Koon, Shot
Shot in the Dark, ARK.
ARK. TIMES,
TIMES, Apr. 24,
24,
2008,
2008, at 10,
10, available at 2008
2008 WLNR
WLNR 9499620.
7.
Railroaded onto Death
Death Row?,
Row?, FoxNEWS.CoM,
FOxNEWS.COM, Feb. 15,
IS, 2006,
2006, para.
para. 4,
7. Radley
Radley Balko,
Balko, Railroaded
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,184992,00.html.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0.2933.184992.OO.html.
8.
8. Id.
Id.
9.
9. Id.
Id.
10.
10. Id.
Id.
11.
J.-CONST., Oct.
II. Id;
Id.; see
see also
also Radley
Radley Balko,
Balko, Drug
Drug War
War Casualties
Casualties Left
Left Behind,
Behind, ATLANTA
ATLANTAJ.-CONST.,
Oct. 6, 2006,
available
available at
at 2006
2006 WLNR
WLNR 17303525.
17303525. Cory
Cory Maye
Maye was
was taken
taken off death
death row
row after
after being
being given
given a hearing
hearing on
on
aa post-trial
post-trial motion,
motion, but
but was
was re-sentenced
re-sentenced to
to life
life imprisonment
imprisonment without
without parole.
parole. Id.;
Id; Region
Region Briefs:
Briefs: Man
Man
Re-Sentenced
for Police
sUN HERALD
HERALD (Biloxi,
(Biloxi, Miss.),
Miss.), Nov. 4,
4, 2007,
2007, at
at A16,
AI6, available at 2007
2007
Re-Sentencedfor
Police Killing,
Killing, SUN
WLNR
WLNR 21819106.
21819106. In
In November
November 2009,
2009, the
the Mississippi
Mississippi Court
Court of
ofAppeals
Appeals granted
granted Maye
Maye aa new
new trial
trial based
based
on
WL 3823287,
3823287, at
at *8
*8 (Miss.
(Miss.
on aa change-of-venue
change-of-venue error.
error. Maye
Maye v.
v. State,
State, No. 2007-KA-02147-COA,
2007-KA-02147-COA, 2009
2009 WL
Ct.
2009); Retrial
Ct. App.
App. Nov.
Nov. 17,
17,2009);
Retrial Ordered
Ordered in
in Officer's
Officer's Killing, CLARION-LEDGER
CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson,
(Jackson, Miss.),
Miss.), Nov.
Nov.
18,
I, available
available at
at 2009
2009 WLNR
WLNR 23254398.
23254398.
18, 2009,
2009, at
at B 1,
12.
12. See
See Koon,
Koon, supra
supra note
note 6.
6.
13.
13. Id.
Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/5
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 586 2009-2010

2

Epstein: Cops or Robbers? How Georgia's Defense of Habitation Statute App

2010)
20101

COPS OR ROBBERS?
ROBBERS?
COPS

587

14 Though
tendon.,,14
Though Ingle
Ingle did not hurt
hurt any of the officers,
officers, he was
was
tendon."
of aggravated
aggravated
charged with, among
among other things,
things, two felony counts
counts of
charged
15
assault. 15
16 Radley
cases outlined above are not isolated
isolated incidents. 16
Radley
The two cases
analyst for the Cato
Cato Institute,
Institute, has
has profiled
profiled more than
Balko, a policy analyst
130 cases
cases of flawed (but
(but not necessarily
necessarily illegal)
illegal) police
police raids
raids that have
have
130
to
innocent
or
death
injury,
humiliation,
serious
InJury,
innocent
resulted in serious
17 Moreover,
bystanders, non-violent
non-violent offenders,
offenders, and officers. 17
bystanders,
according to criminologist
no-knock
criminologist Peter Kraska, the number of no-knock
according
raids across
across the country
country jumped
jumped from 3,000 in 1981 to more
more than
than
18
"knock-andthe
deterioration
50,000
in
2006.
With
deterioration
of
"knock-andthe
2006.18
50,000
announce" requirement, as described
described below,
below, such no-knock raids are
announce"
19
increase.
19
bound to
including Georgia, have liberalized
liberalized
At the same time, many states, including
broad
with
private
their
self-defense
statutes,
private
citizens
broad
providing
their self-defense statutes,
especially upon their
leeway in using deadly force to repel an attack, especially
their
2o
homes. In 2001,
2001, Georgia amended its defense of habitation statute
immunity for someone who uses deadly force
broader immunity
to allow for broader

14. Id.
Id.
was convicted
15. Id.
Id. In
Ingle was
convicted on
on all counts, including
including drug charges, and sentenced
sentenced to
to eighteen
eighteen
In 2009,
2009, Ingle
15, Apr. 15,
Police Search,
Jury Convicts
Convicts After No-Knock Police
years in
years
in prison.
prison. Associated Press, Jury
Search, WXVT IS,

For more
more information
2009,
http://www.wxvt.comlGlobal/story.asp?S= 10191222&nav=rnenu1344_2. For
information
2009, http://www.wxvt.com/Global/story.asp?S=10191222&nav=menu1344_2.
Cops See
Arkansas Blog,
and
discussion on
on topic,
to Arkansas
Blog, NLR
NLR Cops
See Vindication
Vindication
Forrester to
of Tiffney
Tiffney Forrester
topic, see Posting
Posting of
and discussion
(Apr. 16,
16,
Update,
http://www.arktimes.comlblogs/arkansasblog/2009/04/nlr_cops_see_vindication.aspx (Apr.
Update, http://www.arktimes.com/blogs/arkansasblog/2009/04/nlr-cops-see-vindication.aspx
Justice for
2009); see also Justice
for Tracy,
Tracy, http://www.justicefortracy.com
http://www.justicefortracy.com (last visited Feb.
Feb. 6,2010).
6,2010).
43 (Cato
(Cato
POLICE RAIDS
RISE OF
THE RISE
BALKO, OVERKILL:
16. RADLEY
RADLEY BALKO,
16.
OVERKILL: THE
OF PARAMILITARY
PARAMILITARY POLICE
RAIDS IN
IN AMERICA
AMERICA 43
2006).
Institute 2006).
Institute
43-82. Specifically,
Specifically, Balko
17. Id.
Balko profiles seventy-four cases where the police
police got the wrong
Id.at
at 43-82.
address but
address,
the right
but innocent
innocent bystanders
bystanders were
got the
right address
the police
police got
cases where
where the
at 43-63;
43-63; fifteen
fifteen cases
address, id.
id.at
id.at 68-71; twenty-three
of death
death or
or injury
killed
atat 63-68;
injury toto police
police officers,
officers, id.
twenty-three
nine cases
cases of
id.
63-68; nine
killed or
or injured,
injured, id.
at
71id.
"unnecessarily and recklessly"
cases where police used their tactics
tactics "unnecessarily
recklessly" on non-violent offenders, id.
at 71id at 79-82. For an
"defy easy
easy categorization,"
categorization," id.
that "defy
79; and
ten cases
police recklessness
recklessness that
cases of
of similar
similar police
79;
and ten
An
botched police
police raids, see Cato
of botched
interactive map
map of
Cato Institute, Botched Paramilitary Police Raids: An
interactive
6, 2010).
http://www.cato.org/raidmap (last visited
of "Isolated Incidents," http://www.cato.org/raidmap
Epidemic
Epidemic of"lsolated
visited Feb. 6,2010).
in
92, Slain
Slain in
Raid-Woman, 92,
note 1; Harry R. Weber, 2 Officers Admit Crimes
18. Jonsson,
Jonsson, supra
18.
supra note
Crimes in Raid-Woman,
availableat 2007 WLNR
2007, at A7,
(Tenn.), Apr.
Apr. 27,
MEMPHIS COM.
27, 2007,
A7, available
Botched 'No-Knock,' MEMPHIS
COM. APPEAL
APPEAL (Tenn.),
8005661.
8005661.
supra Part I.A.
I; see
see also
also discussion supra
supra note 1;
19. Jonsson,
19.
Jonsson, supra
AssociationTransmogrification of Self-Defense by National
20. P.
P. Luevonda
Ross, The Transmogrification
National Rifle Association20.
Luevonda Ross,
L. REv.
REV. 1,2,
1, 2,
Stand Your Ground,
Ground,35 S.U. L.
Retreatto the Right to Stand
DoctrineofRetreat
Statutes: From
From the Doctrine
InspiredStatutes:
Inspired
18(2007).
18
(2007).
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21
perceived intruder. 21
against a perceived
According to Balko, this trend toward
"dangerously at odds with the concept of noprivate self-defense is "dangerously
' 22 As Justice Brennan acknowledged
knock search
warrants.
search warrants.,,22
acknowledged in Ker
v. California,
California, police "might
"might be mistaken for prowlers and be shot
v.
23
down by a fearful householder."
householder.',23
Though botched police raids, such as Johnston's, are certainly a
problem, most officers are law-abiding
law-abiding professionals who would do
their best to avoid hurting harmless civilians?4
civilians.24 Yet with the decline
of the knock-and-announce
knock-and-announce rule, it is easier than ever for police to
unannounced. 25 This Note examines
examines whether,
legally enter a home unannounced?5
under Georgia's defense of habitation statute, a home dweller
dweller can
lawfully shoot at, and possibly kill, police officers executing a legal
overview of the decaying
no-knock raid. Part I provides
provides a brief overview
decaying
knock-and-announce doctrine
of
knock-and-announce
doctrine and introduces
introduces Georgia's
Georgia's defense of
26
26
habitation statute. Part II first delves into the text of the statute to
determine whether a no-knock entry by police must actually
actually be
unlawful
appear to the occupant
occupant as unlawful for the
unlawful or merely appear
27
This
occupant to be justified
justified in responding with deadly force. 27
statutory analysis
statutory
analysis is followed by a discussion of relevant Georgia
Georgia
case law, both old and new, exploring
exploring how courts have dealt with
28 Finally, Part III
deadly encounters between
between citizens and police.28
proposes
proposes that the defense
defense of habitation statute should be interpreted
interpreted in
in

21. Robert
Vigilant or Vigilante?
Vigilante? Procedure
Rationale for
21.
Robert Christian
Christian Rutlege,
Rutlege, Vigilant
Procedure and Rationale
for Immunity in
Defense
GeorgiaAnnotated §§
§§ 16-3Defense of
of Habitation
Habitation and Defense ofProperty
Property Under
Under the Official Code of Georgia
23, -24,
-24, -24.1,
59 MERCER
23,
-24.1, and
and -24.2,
-24.2, 59
MERCER L.
L. REv.
REv. 629,
629, 641-42
641-42 (2008);
(2008); Derek
Derek E. Empie,
Empie, Defenses to
Criminal
of Force
Force in the Defense ofHabitations
Habitations or
or
Criminal Prosecution:
Prosecution: Change
Change Provisions
Provisions Relating to the Use of
Residences;
infra Part
Residences; Provide
Provide for Related Matters,
Matters, 18
18 GA. ST. U. L. REv.
REv. 25,
25, 25-29
25-29 (2001);
(2001); see also infra
II.A.3.
22. Koon,
for Disaster:
22.
Koon, supra
supra note
note 6;
6; see also G.
G. Todd
Todd Butler,
Butler, Note, Recipe
Recipefor
Disaster: Analyzing
Analyzing the Interplay
1nterplay
Between
Between the
the Castle Doctrine
Doctrine and the Knock-and-Announce Rule After
After Hudson
Hudson v. Michigan,
Michigan, 27
27 MiSS.
MISS. C.
C.
L. REv.
REv. 435,
435, 451
451 (2008).
(2008).
58 (1963)
23. BALKO,
BALKO, supra
supra note
note 16, at 31
31 (quoting Ker v. California,
California, 374
374 U.S. 23,
23,58
(1963) (Brennan,
(Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
dissenting».
24. See Hudson
598-99 (2006)
Hudson v.
v. Michigan,
Michigan, 547
547 U.S.
U.S. 586,
586,598-99
(2006) (describing
(describing the rise in the professionalism
professionalism
of police
police forces).
25. See discussion
discussion infra Part
Part I.A.
LA.
26. See infra
infra Part
Part 1.
I.
27.
27. See infra Part
Part B.A.
II.A.
28.
28. See infra
infra Part
Part I.B-C.
II.B-C.
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favor of the occupant, granting immunity to one who mistakenly, but
29
legal no-knock
during aa legal
police officers
at police
reasonably, shoots at
officers during
no-knock entry.
entry?9
BACKGROUND: THE NEED
HABITATION
I. BACKGROUND:
NEED TO KNOCK
KNOCK AND DEFENSE OF HABITATION

The knock-and-announce
knock-and-announce requirement, written into the Georgia
Georgia
Code under section 17-5_27,30
been significantly
watered down,
17-5-27,30 has been
significantly watered
31 But Georgia's
paving
Georgia's
paving the way for an increase
increase in no-knock entries. 31
defense of habitation statute may still provide plenty
plenty of protection
protection to
32
frightened home dwellers. 32
A. The Knock-and-Announce
Knock-and-Announce Rule: Fact
or Fiction?
Fact or
Fiction?
The knock-and-announce
knock-and-announce rule, as the name suggests, requires
officers to knock and announce themselves before
before breaking
breaking into
33
someone's home to execute a search or arrest warrant. 33
It is not
34
34
requirement makes sense. In Hudson
Hudson v.
difficult to see why such a requirement
Michigan,
Justice
Michigan,
Scalia laid out the basic interests
interests protected
protected by the
knock-and-announce rule. 35 First and foremost is human life---"an
knock-and-announce
life-"an
unannounced entry may provoke
self-defense
unannounced
provoke violence in supposed self-defense
36
resident." The second interest is to protect
by the surprised
surprised resident.,,36
protect
37 After
property, such as the door itself,
itself, from damage by the police.37
After
l.
29. See infra
infra Part III.
30. The statute provides, in part:
All necessary and reasonable
reasonable force may be used to effect an entry into any building or
property
after verbal
verbal notice
notice or
or an
an attempt in
property or part thereof to execute
execute a search warrant
warrant if,
if, after
good faith
notice by the officer directed to execute the same of his
good
faith to give verbal notice
....
authority and purpose ....
17-5-27 (2008)
(emphasis added).
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-27
(2008) (emphasis
31. BALKO,
BALKO, supra
also Mark Josephson, Supreme Court Review, Fourth
supra note 16, at 5; see also
Fourth
31.
PoliceKnock andAnnounce Themselves Before Kicking in the Door of a House?,
Amendment-Must Police
House?, 86
J.CRIM.
CRIMINOLOGY 1229,
1262-63 (1996). See generally
J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1229, 1262--{j3
generally Brian S. Uholik,
Uholik, Comment, Who
Cares If
If It's
It's Open?:
Open?: Hudson v. Michigan
United States
States Supreme Court's
Court's Evisceration
Evisceration of the
Cares
Michigan and the United
261,277-79,291
Knock and Announce Rule, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. 261,
277-79, 291 (2007).
(2007).
also discussion
32. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23
16-3-23 (2007); see also
discussion infra
infra Part II.A.
II.A.
33. 18
18 U.S.C. § 3109
3109 (2006);
ANN. § 17-5-27
17-5-27 (2008).
(2008).
33.
(2006); GA. CODE ANN.
34. See generally
generally Hudson
Hudson v. Michigan,
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586,
586, 593-94 (2006) (describing
(describing the reasons
reasons behind
knock-and-announce requirement).
the knock-and-announce
35. !d.
Id.at 594
594 (holding that concealment
concealment of incriminating
incriminating evidence is not an
an interest protected
protected by the
knock-and-announce
knock-and-announce requirement).
Id.
36. !d.
37. Id.
Id.
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all, the police should give residents
residents a chance to comply with the law
38 Finally, knocking
and peacefully
peacefully let the officers inside their homes. 38
and announcing
announcing protects people's privacy and dignity by allowing
allowing
them to collect themselves-by
themselves-by putting on their clothes, for
door. 39
answering the
example-before
the door.39
example-before answering
Given the importance
importance of the interests protected
protected by the knock-andannounce requirement, one should not be surprised that the rule is an
"ancient one,'.40
one," 40 long
long entrenched
entrenched in the Anglo-American
"ancient
Anglo-American legal
4411
principle was first judicially recognized
recognized in Britain in
tradition. The principle
42
160342 and has been part of American common
1603
common law since the
43
43
government codified the rule in
founding of the nation. The federal government
1917, and a majority of states, including
including Georgia, have done so as
44
44
well. Moreover, the Supreme
Supreme Court recognized
recognized the knock-andwell.
45 The
announce principle as a "command"
"command" of
the Fourth Amendment. 45
announce
ofthe
long history and prevalence of the knock-and-announce
knock-and-announce doctrine
doctrine
46
46
common
Although the common
should illustrate
illustrate how much society values it. Although
law did not require announcement
circumstances, 47 it may
announcement in all circumstances,47
nonetheless be surprising to learn just how easily the police can burst
nonetheless
48
into a home unannounced.
unannounced.48

Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
Id.
Hudson, 547
U.S. at
at 589.
589.
40. Hudson,
547 U.S.
41. Wilson
514 U.S.
U.S. 927,
927, 934
934 (1995)
(citing Miller
United States,
357 U.S.
301, 313
313
41.
Wilson v.v. Arkansas,
Arkansas, 514
(1995) (citing
Miller v.v. United
States, 357
U.S. 301,
(1958)).
(1958».
42.
supra note
1235 (citing
(citing Semayne's
Semayne's Case,
(1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96
42. Josephson,
Josephson, supra
note 31,
31, atat 1235
Case, (1603)
(K.B.)).
Arkansas, Justice Thomas suggests
that the
may actually
actually go
much further,
further,
(K.B.». In Wilson v.v. Arkansas,
suggests that
the rule
rule may
go back
back much
originating
originating from aa statute enacted
enacted inin 1275. Wilson, 514
514 U.S.
U.S. atat 932
932 n.2.
n.2.
43.
supranote 31,
31, at 1237-38.
43. Josephson,
Josephson, supra
44. Id.
at 1239.
1239. The
The federal
codified in
in 18
18 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 3109 (2006);
Id. at
federal knock-and-announce
knock-and-announce requirement
requirement isis codified
Georgia's
Georgia's may be found
found in GA.
GA. CODE
CODE ANN. § 17-5-27 (2008).
45. Hudson, 547
547 U.S.
U.S. at
at 589
Wilson, 514
514 U.S.
U.S. at
934). The
that the
the
589 (citing
(citing Wilson,
at 934).
The court
court inin Wilson held
held that
knock-and-announce
knock-and·announce principle
principle isis "an
"an element
element of
of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth
Fourth
Amendment."
Amendment." Wilson, 514
514 U.S. at 934. The
The court also noted that
that the announcement
announcement requirement isis not
not aa
"rigid
countervailing law
"rigid rule...
rule ... that ignores countervailing
law enforcement
enforcement interests."
interests." Id.
Id.
46. E.g., Uholik,
Uholik, supra
supra note
note 31, at 292.
292.
47. Wilson, 514 U.S.
U.S. at 935.
935.
48. See Hudson,
Hudson, 547 U.S. at
at 589-90
589-90 (holding that
that even
even if the police violated the
the knock-andknock-andannounce
announce requirement, evidence gathered in the
the subsequent search
search is admissible
admissible in court);
court); see also
also
Josephson,
31, at 1262-63.
supranote
Josephson, supra
supra note 31,
1262--63. See generally
generally Uholik,
Uholik, supra
note 31,
31, atat 291.
291.
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To illustrate, in Hudson
Hudson v. Michigan,
speaking for
Michigan, Justice Scalia, speaking
the Court, succinctly described
the
flexibility
and
vagueness
described
vagueness of the
knock-and-announce
knock
-and-announce requirement:
[There are] many situations in which it is not necessary to knock
knock
and announce. It is not necessary when 'circumstances
'circumstances presen[t]
a threat of physical
violence,' or if there is 'reason
physical violence,'
'reason to believe that
evidence
evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice was
49 or if knocking and announcing would be 'futile.'so
given,'
'futile.' 50 We
given,'49
require only that police 'have
'have a reasonable
reasonable suspicion
suspicion..,
... under
the particular circumstances'
circumstances' that one of these grounds for failing
acknowledged that
to knock and announce exists, and we have acknowledged
5
'[t]his
'[t]his showing is not high.'SI
high.' '

The Court in Hudson
Hudson held that even if police
police unlawfully
unlawfully fail to
announce
evidence seized in the ensuing search
announce themselves,
themselves, the evidence
search need
need
suppressed at trial because
not be suppressed
concealment is not one of
of
because evidence concealment
52
52
the interests protected
by
the
knock-and-announce
rule.
Thus,
the
protected
knock-and-announce
Court "destroy[
"destroy[ed]
ed] the strongest legal incentive
incentive to
comply with the
53
requirement."
Constitution's knock-and-announce
knock-and-announce requirement.,,53
Constitution's
knock-and-announce statute mandates that an
In Georgia, the knock-and-announce
officer
give
"verbal
notice
or an attempt in good faith to give verbal
officer
"verbal
54 However, "a
notice"
notice" before breaking down the door. 54
"a warrant can
. .. .. demonstrate
demonstrate 'a
authorize a 'no-knock'
'no-knock' entry where police .
reasonable
presence...
reasonable suspicion that knocking
knocking and announcing
announcing their presence
...
would be dangerous
or
futile,
or
that
it
would
inhibit
the
effective
dangerous
destruction
investigation of the crime by, for example,
example, allowing the destruction
' 55
high": 56
"not
is
showing
this
Hudson,
with
of the evidence.'
evidence.",55 In line
Hudson, this showing is "not high,,:56
49. Hudson,
Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936).
Hudson, 547 U.S. at
at 589
589 (alteration
(alteration in original) (quoting Wilson,
394 (1997».
(1997)).
50. Id.
Id. at
at 589-90
589-90 (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385,
385,394
Richards,520
U.S. at
at 394).
394).
51. Id.
Id. at
at 590
590 (alteration
(alteration in original)
original) (quoting Richards,
520 U.S.
52. Id.
Id. at
at 594.
594.
53. Id.
Id. at
at 605 (Breyer,
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
54. GA. CODE
CODE ANN.
17-5-27 (2008).
54.
ANN. § 17-5-27
(2008).
55. Jackson
Jackson v. State, 634
634 S.E.2d 846,
846, 848 (Ga. Ct.
Ct. App. 2006) (quoting
(quoting State
State v. Williams, 621
2005)).
S.E.2d 581,
581, 583
583 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005».
Hudson, 547
56. Poole
Poole v. State,
State, 596
596 S.E.2d 420, 424 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Hudson,
547 U.S. at 590).
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To establish reasonable
reasonable grounds
grounds [for a no-knock warrant],
warrant], the
officer
does
not
have
to
show
specific
information
officer
specific information that would
lead officers to conclude that they would be harmed
harmed if they
announced their authority
announced
authority and purpose;
purpose; it is sufficient if the
information...
information ... would lead to the reasonable conclusion that the
.....57
officers could be harmed
harmed....

State, a no-knock warrant
For example,
example, in Hunter
Hunter v. State,
warrant was authorized
authorized
where an informant
informant told officers
officers that automatic
automatic weapons may be
58
Cochran, a no-knock
found in the house. 58 In State v. Cochran,
no-knock warrant was
authorized
based
on
an
informant's
assertion
that Cochran
authorized
Cochran carried
carried
59
firearms and "will not go down without a fight.
,,59 Moreover, even
fireanns
fight.",
even
absent a no-knock
unannounced entry would still be
no-knock warrant, an unannounced
be
justified by the presence
presence of exigent
exigent circumstances, defined as
"'reasonable
grounds
to
believe
that
forewarning would either greatly
'''reasonable grounds to believe that forewarning
greatly
[officers']'] peril or lead to the immediate
increase [officers
immediate destruction of the
60 Thus, police violations
evidence.'",60
violations of the knock-and-announce
knock-and-announce
evidence.
principle are only part of the danger
because it is relatively easy for
danger because
officers to legally dispense
dispense with this requirement. 61
-

57. Cook v. State,
State, 565 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 896, 898 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002);
2002); see also State v. Cochran, 620 S.E.2d
444,447 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
2005).
641,644
58. Hunter v. State,
State, 400 S.E.2d 641,
644 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
Poole, 596 S.E.2d at 423-24 (finding no exigent
59. Cochran, 620 S.E.2d at 447. But see Poole,
exigent
circumstances justifYing
justifying a no-knock
circumstances
no-knock entry where
where police decided to break into the house unannounced
unannounced
after a person
person inside the residence looked out the window and went back
back inside).
Poole, 596 S.E.2d at 422
221, 222 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)); see
60. Poole,
422 (quoting State v. Smith, 467 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 221,
also Martin v. State, 302
722 (Ga.
also
302 S.E.2d 614, 615 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Scull v. State, 178 S.E.2d 720,
720,722
Ct. App. 1970).
61. BALKO,
supra note 16, at 5, 30, 31.
31. Balko argues that the knock-and-announce
knock-and-announce requirement is
61.
BALKO, supra
court-sanctioned loop-holes, ignored
"commonly either
either circumvented
circumvented through court-sanctioned
ignored completely with little
consequence,
consequence, or only ceremoniously
ceremoniously observed, with a knock and announcement
announcement unlikely to be noticed
Id. at 5. In
by anyone inside." Id.
In 2008, Georgia Senate passed a bill that would have
have made
made it tougher for
& Bob Kemper, Political
ATLANTA J.police to get no-knock search warrants. Jim Galloway &
Political Insider,
Insider, ATLANTA
CONST., Mar. 11,2008,
11, 2008, available
CONST.,
available at 2008 WLNR 5381369. However, the bill never made it past the
House and into law. See SB 259, as passed Senate, 2008 Ga. Gen. Assem.,
available at
Assem., available
http://www.legis.ga.govlegis/2007_08/fultext/sb259.htm. It is unclear
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legiS/2007_08/fulltextlsb259.htm.Itis
unclear how such
such legislation
legislation would
circumstances." See supra
supra text accompanying
accompanying
affect warrantless
warrantless no-knock entries
entries made due to "exigent circumstances."
note 60.
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B. Defending Your Home in Georgia
Georgia

The Georgia defense of habitation
habitation statute, found in section
section 16-3-23
of the Georgia
Georgia Code, allows persons
to use deadly force in defending
defending
62
62
intruders:
against
homes
their
against intruders:
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another
another
reasonably believes
when and to the extent that he or she reasonably
believes that
prevent or terminate such
such threat or force is necessary to prevent
other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation;
habitation; however,
such person is justified
justified in the use of force which is intended or
if:
likely to cause
cause death or great bodily harm only if:
(1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous
(1)
is
manner and he or she reasonably believes
believes that the entry is
offering
attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering
personal violence to any person dwelling or being therein and
that such force is necessary to prevent
prevent the assault or offer of
personal violence;
(2) That force is used against another person who is not a
(2)
household and who unlawfully and
and
member of the family or household
forcibly enters or has unlawfully
unlawfully and forcibly entered the
residence and the person using such force knew or had reason to
believe that an unlawful
unlawful and forcible entry occurred; or
or
(3) The
person using
such force
force reasonably
(3)
The person
using such
reasonably believes
believes that
that the
the
attempted for the purpose of committing a
entry is made or attempted
felony therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the
commission of the felony.63
felony.63
Whoever uses deadly force under
under this statute is immune
immune from
prosecution. 64 So is defense of habitation
habitation the only way to justify
justify
killing an intruder?
GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-23
16-3-23 (2007).
62. GA.
CODE ANN.
63. [d.
Id. Subsection
Subsection (2)
"Make My Day Bill," was added
(2) of the statute, referred to as the "Make
added in 2001.
2001.
supranote 21,
21, at 25,
25, 28-29. For discussion of the amendment,
amendment, see infra Part II.A.3.
II.A.3.
Empie, supra
64. GA.
GA. CODE
CODE ANN.
ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (2007); Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227, 230 (Ga. 2008)
2008) (citing Boggs
722, 723 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)) (holding that immunity
v. State, 581 S.E.2d 722,723
immunity is determined as a matter
matter of
of
law before
before the start of the trial). Section 16-3-24.2
16-3-24.2 provides:
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Actually,
statutes may
may grant
immunity to
to
Actually, two other
other similar
similar statutes
grant immunity
65
occupants
who use
use deadly
force against
against intruders.
Section 16-3-24
16-3-24
occupants who
deadly force
intruders.
Section
addresses
defense of
property other
other than
habitation, 66 and
addresses the
the defense
of property
than habitation,66
and section
section
67
16-3-21
However, the defense
of
defense of
addresses general
general self-defense.
self-defense. 6 7 However,
16-3-21 addresses
habitation
statute, section
section 16-3-23,
provides broader
protection than
habitation statute,
16-3-23, provides
broader protection
than
68
immunity statutes.
(2) of
the other
other immunity
This is partly because
because subsection
subsection (2)
of
section 16-3-23 "may
"may not
require the
defender of
of habitation
habitation to
to have
have
section
not require
the defender
is necessary. 69
reasonable belief'
objectively reasonable
an
an objectively
belief' that
that the
the use
use of
of force
force is necessary.69
Moreover,
the defense
defense of
statute may
use of
Moreover, the
of habitation
habitation statute
may justify
justify the
the use
of
deadly
force "even
"even if
if that
that amount
was not
necessarily
deadly force
amount of
of force
force was
not necessarily
70
required
[an] attack.,,70
attack.", Thus,
Thus, in
case where
defendant
required to
to repel
repel [an]
in any
any case
where aa defendant
is
accused
of
shooting
a
police
officer
during
a
raid,
it
is
crucial to
is accused of shooting a police officer during a raid, it is crucial
to
71
16-3-23.71
section
habitation under
plead
plead defense
defense of
of habitation
under section 16-3-23.

16-3-23,
A person who uses threats
threats or force in accordance
accordance with Code Section 16-3-21,
16-3-21, 16-3-23,
16-3-23.1, or 16-3-24 shall
prosecution therefor
shaH be immune from criminal
criminal prosecution
therefor unless in the
16-3-23.1,
is
use of deadly
deadly force, such person utilizes a weapon
weapon the carrying
carrying or possession of which is
II of this title.
unlawful by such person under Part
Part 2 or 3 of Article
Article 4 of Chapter
Chapter 11
65. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21,
16-3-21, -24, -24.2 (2007); Rutlege, supra
supra note 221,
1, at 630-33.
630-33.
66. Section 16-3-24(b)
16-3-24(b) provides:
The use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to
prevent trespass on or other tortious or criminal interference
interference with real property
property other than
a habitation
habitation or personal
personal property is not justified unless the person using such force
reasonably believes
commission of a forcible felony.
reasonably
believes that it is necessary to prevent the commission
67. Section 16-3-21(a)
16-3-2 I (a) provides:
A person
person is justified in threatening
threatening or using force against another when and to the extent
extent
that he or she reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary
himself
necessary to defend himself
or herself or a third person against
against such other's imminent use of unlawful
unlawful force; however,
except as provided in Code Section
16-3-23, a person is justified in using force which is
Section 16-3-23,
intended
intended or likely to cause
cause death or great bodily harm only if he or she reasonably
believes that such force is necessary
necessary to prevent death or great bodily
bodily injury
injury to himself or
herself or a third person or to prevent the commission of a forcible
forcible felony.
68. Rutlege, supra
supra note 21,
21, at 631.
63 I.
Id.
69. Id.
70. Benham
16-3-23 (2007),
Benham v. State, 591 S.E.2d 824, 826 (Ga. 2004). Compare GA. CODE
CODE ANN. § 16-3-23
16-3-2 1. But see Patel v. State, 620 S.E.2d 343, 348 (Ga. 2005)
with § 16-3-21.
2005) (Carley, J.,
J., concurring) ("Benham
("Benham
should be
cautiously and
sensibly limited
limited to its actual
16-3should
be cautiously
and sensibly
actual holding by the express
express terms of [section] 16-3....
"
23 ....
").).
71. See Benham, 591 S.E.2d at 826 (finding ineffective
71.
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to plead
immunity statutes described
allow the
described above aHow
immunity under the defense of habitation statute). All the immunity
defendant to avoid trial altogether, thereby conferring
"a far greater right than
conferring "a
than any encompassed
encompassed by an
defendant must
affirmative defense."
defense." Bunn
Buon v. State, 667 S.E.2d 605, 608 (Ga. 2008). To avoid trial, the defendant
prove immunity by a preponderance
preponderance of the evidence. Id.
still assert an
Id. Failing that, the defendant may stiH
prosecution must
Id. In that case, the prosecution
affirmative defense at trial based
based on the immunity statutes. Id.
disprove the defense
Id.
defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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EXPLORING THE STATUTE AND
ANALYSIS: EXPLORING
SURROUNDING CASE LAW
SURROUNDING

The main paragraph
16-3-23 states that persons may use
paragraph of section 16-3-23
deadly force if they reasonably
reasonably believe
believe that it is necessary
necessary to prevent
72 The first issue
an "unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation."
habitation.,,72
in applying the statute is to determine whether the entry or attack on a
habitation must actually be unlawful, or if instead the occupant must
73
only reasonably believe that the entry or attack is unlawful.73
After
all, if the entry must actually be unlawful, then a home occupant who
shoots an officer
of
officer during a raid would not be able to plead defense of
habitation
habitation as long as the officer
officer had a warrant and otherwise
74
complied
Second,
Second, it is helpful to see how Georgia
Georgia
complied with the law.74
courts have historically dealt with deadly confrontations
confrontations between
between
police and citizens, and whether officers enjoyed
any
special
enjoyed
75
75
protection
protection under the law. Finally, this Part will explore some
Georgia cases that have actually applied the defense of habitation
statute to police-civilian
police-civilian encounters.76
76

72.
16-3-23 (2007)
(emphasis added).
72. GA. CODE ANN.
ANN. §§ 16-3-23
(2007) (emphasis
unnecessary deaths are lawfully
73. Many
Many no-knock raids that result in unnecessary
lawfully (though not necessarily
prudently) carried
BALKO, supra
supra note 16,
16, at 7\-79.
71-79. For an example of a recent
carried out by police. See BALKO,
Georgia
State, 664 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 227, 233-37 (Ga. 2008)
2008) (finding that the warrant, manner
of
Georgia case, see Fair
Fair v. State,
manner of
entry, and search
search of the house were valid where
where the defendants shot and killed an officer thinking
thinking they
were
were being attacked). In his treatise on Georgia criminal
criminal offenses
offenses and defenses, Robert
Robert Cleary states that
"[flor
habitation to be applicable, it is essential that the entry
entry defended against be
"[f]or the defense of habitation
unlawful." ROBERT E. CLEARY,
DI 7 KURTZ CRIMINAL
AND DEFENSES
DEFENSES IN
unlawful."
CLEARY, JR.,
JR., 017
CRIMINAL OFFENSES
OFFENSES AND
IN GEORGIA, at IV
IV
(2008). However, the cases Cleary
id.at n.34. The two
Cleary cites for this proposition
proposition are not so clear-cut. See id
most relevant
Leach v. State,
Washington v.
State, 239 S.E.2d 177 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) and Washington
relevant cases
cases cited
cited are Leach
State, 263 S.E.2d 152 (Ga. 1980). CLEARY,
CLEARY, supra,
supra, at nn.35-36. These two cases are
are discussed in detail
infra Part II.C.
B.C.
infra
74. See, e.g.,
e.g., State
Gardinerconcluded, in
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568,
568, 576 (Utah 1991). The
The court in Gardiner
statute]1to exclude peace officers acting
dicta, that "the
"the legislature intended [the defense of habitation statute
acting in
the course of their duties."
duties." Id.
Id. The court actually
actually held that the defense
defense of habitation statute did not apply
because
/d. at 575. Utah's defense of habitation
habitation
because the place allegedly defended was not a habitation. Id.
Georgia's. Compare
Compare UTAH CODE ANN.
ANN.
ANN. § 76-2-405
76-2-405 (2004), with GA. CODE ANN.
statute is similar to Georgia'S.
§ 16-3-23
16-3-23 (2007).
(2007).
infra Part II.B.
II.B.
75. See discussion infra
infra Part II.C.
II.C.
76. See discussion infra
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A. Letter
Letter and
and Spirit
Spirit ofthe Law

The actual language
language of the statute is the most important
important factor in its
77
interpretation. 77
In decoding section 16-3-23,
16-3-23, this Note explores the
interpretation.
cases that have interpreted the language, and
and
wording of the text,
78
history.
legislative history. 78
legislative
1. Breaking
Breaking Down the Text
1.
Text
First, it is important
important to look at the common-sense grammatical
79
Looking at the statute, one can ask what
structure of the text. 79
justifies the use of force? The answer is "reasonable
"reasonable belief that
.... ,,80
,80 Logically, reasonable
•..•
reasonable belief qualifies the rest of the sentence
sentence
81
81
after the word that.
reasonable belief also qualifies
that. If so, then reasonable
entry, allowing a person to use force merely on reasonable
reasonable
unlawful entry,
82
belief that the entry is unlawful. 82 But even if unlawful entry is not
qualified by reasonable
belief, it is possible that the second
reasonable belief,
second clause,
clause,
after the first semi-colon ("however, such person is justified
justified in the
use of [deadly] force ...
. . . only if
if. ...
. .,,83),
,,83), is a completely separate
deadly force-a
force-a
statement explaining when someone can use deadly
statement that is unqualified
by
the
previous
clause
dealing
with the
unqualified
previous clause
84
84
use of non-deadly physical force. Although the addition of the word
only to the second clause makes it more restrictive, the restriction

& DAVID CHARLES
INTERPRETATION:
77. LINDA D. JELLUM
JELLUM &
CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN
MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
PROBLEMS, THEORIES,
PROBLEMS,
THEORIES, AND LAWYERING
LAWYERING STRATEGIES
STRATEGIES 7,
7, 8 (2006); see also NORMAN
NORMAN J. SINGER
SINGER &
& J.D.
SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND
SUTHERLAND STATUTES
STATUTES AND
CONSTRUCTION § 46:1
2008)
SHAMBlE
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
46:1 (7th
(7th ed. 2008)
(discussing the plain meaning rule).
78. See generally
generally SINGER
SINGER &
& SINGER,
SINGER, supra
supra note 77, § 45 (discussing
(discussing criteria
criteria for statutory
interpretation). There
There are other ways to interpret a statute, such as by reference
interpretation).
reference to statutes on other
other
subjects, id
id. § 53,
53, or similar statutes of other
analysis
subjects,
other states, id.
id § 52, but such broad and comprehensive
comprehensive analysis
is beyond
beyond the purview of this note.
id. § 47:1 (discussing
"[a] legislature
79. See id.
(discussing textual construction of statutes). However, "[a]
legislature is not
compelled by any superior force to obey the rules of grammar
grammar and composition."
composition." Id.
Id
80. GA. CODE ANN.
ANN. § 16-3-23
16-3-23 (2007).
81.
Interview with
81. Interview
with Doug Ramseur, Senior Staff Attorney, Office of the Ga. Capital Defender,
Atlanta, Ga. (Oct. 23,
Interview].
23, 2008)
2008) [hereinafter
[hereinafter Ramseur Interview].
82. Id.
Id.
83.
83. GA.
GA. CODE ANN.
ANN. §§ 16-3-23 (2007) (emphasis added).
added).
84. Id.; see also
also Ramseur
supranote 81.
81.
Ramseur Interview, supra
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may come
come from
from other
other conditions,
conditions, other
other than
than unlawfulness,
unlawfulness, that
that are
may
(3).85
and
(2),
(1),
subsections
in
described in subsections (1), (2), and (3).85
described
helps to
to look
look at
at some
some of
of the
the rules
rules of
of statutory
statutory
Next, it helps
86
86
construction. According
According to
to the
the rule
rule of
of surplusage,
surplusage, "[i]t is
is aa 'cardinal
'cardinal
construction.
statute ought, upon
upon the whole,
whole, to
to be
be so
so
principle .
. .. .. ' that 'a'a statute
principle
construed that, if it can
can be prevented,
prevented, no clause,
clause, sentence,
sentence, or
or word
word
construed
87
subsection
Thus,
in
shall
be
superfluous,
void,
or
insignificant.
",87
subsection
insignificant."'
shall be superfluous,
(2), the word unlawfully was
was probably
probably used
used for a purpose
purpose and
and must be
be
(2),
and (3),
(3), where
where the
the word
word unlawful was
contrasted with subsections
subsections (1) and
contrasted
88
88
Moreover, "where
"where the legislature
legislature has employed
employed a term
term in
not used. Moreover,
implied
not
be
it
should
it
in
another,
excluded
and
one place
place
excluded
should
implied where
where
89
excluded.,,89 Thus, the word unlawful should not be implied
implied in
excluded.,
(3), where it seems
seems to have been left
left out
subsections (1) and (3),
subsections
90
purposefuUy.90 If
If the legislature
legislature intended
intended to require unlawful
unlawful entry, it
purposefully.
91
,.9]
In
the
words
the
Georgia
Supreme Court,
"knew
how
to
do
so.
Georgia
of
words
so."
"knew
legislature's] failure to do so was a
"[w]e
presume that [the legislature's]
"[w]e must presume
92
choice."
considered choice.,,92
matter of considered
Due to the ambiguity of the language, the rule of lenity may also
also
93
against
"instinctive
apply.93
The
rule
developed
from
an
"instinctive
distaste
men
developed
apply.
languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said that they
94 Thus, a court may interpret the statute in favor of the
should.
,,94
should.",
81.
supra note
note 81.
Interview, supra
Ramseur Interview,
also Ramseur
(2007); see also
16-3-23(1-3) (2007);
CODE ANN.
ANN. §§ 16-3-23(1-3)
85. See GA.
GA. CODE
the role
role of
86.
77, § 47:1
of the actual
actual text in statutory
47:1 (describing
(describing the
note 77,
supra note
& SINGER,
SINGER, supra
SINGER &
86. SINGER
interpretation).
interpretation).
Duncan v.
v. Walker,
87.
& HRICIK,
147 (quoting
(quoting Duncan
Walker, 533
533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001));
note 77,
77, at
at 147
supra note
HRICI., supra
87. JELLUM
JELLUM &
statute is
is given
each word
see also
also SINGER
(discussing how
word inin aa statute
given effect).
how each
46:6 (discussing
note 77,
77, § 46:6
supra note
SINGER &
& SINGER,
SINGER, supra
supranote 77, §§ 46:6.
88. See generally
SINGER, supra
SINGER&& SINGER,
generally SINGER
89. Id.
Id.
90. See
generally id.
Seegenerallyid.
v. Ga.
Ga.
& Packaging
Packaging v.
Paperboard &
Inland Paperboard
2008) (quoting
(quoting Inland
91.
227, 232
232 (Ga. 2008)
S.E.2d 227,
v. State,
State, 664
664 S.E.2d
91. Fair
Fair v.
(Ga. Ct.
Ct. App.
App. 2005)). In all fairness, one can argue that, because
873, 876
876 (Ga.
Dep't
616 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 873,
of Revenue,
Revenue, 616
Dep't of
the
in enacting
enacting the
the legislature,
legislature, in
it is
is possible
possible that the
of the
the statute,
statute, it
subsection
the rest
rest of
added after
after the
(2) was
was added
subsection (2)
"entry" in both original
section to qualify "entry"
original
in the
the first
first section
"unlawful" in
the word
word ''unlawful''
intended the
statute, intended
original statute,
include
intent to
to include
legislature's intent
belied the
the legislature'S
of a
a statute
statute belied
the history
history of
id.
(stating that
that the
subsections.
(stating
generally id.
See generally
subsections. See
legislature's part in enacting
careless oversight
oversight on the legislature'S
imply careless
or
that would
would imply
However, that
a provision).
provision). However,
or omit
omit a
77, §§ 46:6.
46:6.
supranote
note 77,
& SINGER,
SINGER, supra
SINGER &
generallySINGER
subsection
(2). See generally
subsection (2).
& Packaging,
Packaging,616 S.E.2d at 876).
Paperboard&
InlandPaperboard
664 S.E.2d
S.E.2d at 232 (quoting Inland
Fair,664
92. Fair,
should
a person
person should
holds that
that a
of lenity generally holds
at 386. The rule of
note 77,
77, at
HRICIK, supra
supra note
93.
JELLUM &
& HRICIK,
93. JELLUM
illegal." Id.
Id
could not know was illegal."
"a reasonable
reasonable person could
a crime
crime that
that "a
not
for a
not be
be punished
punished for
U.S. 291,
291,
R.L.C., 503
503 U.S.
States v.
v. R.L.e.,
United States
2004) (quoting
(quoting United
147, 150
150 (Ga.
(Ga. 2004)
S.E.2d 147,
596 S.E.2d
94. Dixon
Dixon v. State, 596
94.
v. Gonzales, 407
(quoting United States v.
77, at
at 386
386 (quoting
305
supranote
note 77,
& HRICIK,
HRICIK, supra
also JELLUM
JELLUM &
(1992)); see
see also
305 (1992));
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95 However, courts
defendant
defendant and not require actual unlawful entry.
entry.95
usually apply the rule of lenity only when all other sources of
of
96
96
interpretation have been exhausted. One cannot be certain
statutory interpretation
certain
that a court will find sufficient
sufficient ambiguity in the defense of habitation
habitation
statute to resort to this rule.

from the Bench
2. Answers
Answersfrom
The Georgia
Supreme Court in Hammock v. State,
State, armed
Georgia Supreme
armed with two
97 In
rules of statutory construction,
attempted
to
decipher
the statute. 97
construction, attempted
In
Hammock,
Hammock, the defendant, seeking shelter
shelter from her husband, locked
bedroom. 98 When the husband broke down the door and
herself in the bedroom.98
advanced on the defendant to "teach her a lesson,"
lesson," she shot him in the
advanced
99
99
chest, killing him. The court reasoned that because
because subsections
subsections (1)
(3) of section
16-3-23 did not mention members of the same
and (3)
section 16-3-23
"the lack of limiting language
household, unlike subsection
subsection (2), then "the
in subsections
subsections (1) and (3) shows the legislature's intent to allow these
subsections
co-inhabitants."' 0° The same can be
subsections to apply between
between co-inhabitants."loo
said for the word "unlawful":
"unlawful": its absence in subsections (1) and (3)
shows that the legislature
legislature did not intend for unlawfulness
unlawfulness to be

F.3d
unlawfulness does not
F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 2005)). Note,
Note, however, that the question of
of unlawfolness
not address the
the
conduct
conduct of
of the actor,
actor, but
but rather
rather the
the status
status of the potential
potential victim. See discussion infra Part III.A. So
So ifif the
the
the occupant
statute were toto be
be interpreted
interpreted as requiring
requiring actual
actual unlawful
unlawful entry,
entry, the
the guilt or
or innocence of the
occupant
would
would depend not on the actor's subjective
subjective conduct, but
but on
on the status of
of the
the intruder.
intruder. See discussion
discussion
infra Part I1I.A.
lI.A.
1993) ("[A criminal
95. Fleet
Fleet Fin., Inc.
Inc. of
of Ga. v. Jones, 430
430 S.E.2d 352, 355 (Ga. 1993)
criminal statute]
statute] must be
construed
construed strictly against criminal
criminal liability and,
and, if it is susceptible to more than
than one
one reasonable
reasonable
interpretation, the interpretation most
most favorable
favorable to
to the party facing criminal
criminal liability must be adopted.");
see JELLUM &
& HRICIK, supra
supra note 77, at
at 386.
386.
96.
600, 619 n.17 (1994)
(1994) ("[The
96. United
United States v. Staples, 511
511 U.S.
U.S. 600,619
("[The rule
rule of lenity]
lenity] 'is'is reserved for
for
cases
derived,' the
'left with an
cases where,
where, after seizing
seizing every thing
thing from which aid
aid can
can be
be derived,'
the Court
Court isis 'left
an
ambiguous
supranote
ambiguous statute."'
statute. '" (citations omitted)); JELLUM &
& HRICIK,
HRICIK, supra
note 77, atat 386.
386.
97.
97. Hammock
Hammock v. State, 592 S.E.2d 415,
415, 418
418 (Ga. 2004). The court
court applied two principles of statutory
statutory
"expressio unius est exc1usio
exclusio alterius
alterius (expression of
interpretation: "expressio
of one
one thing implies exclusion
exclusion of
of
cessare taciturn
another) and expressum facit
facit cessare
tacitum (if some things
things are expressly
expressly mentioned,
mentioned, the
the inference
inference is
Id.
stronger that those not mentioned were
were intended toto be excluded)."
excluded)." Id.
98. Id.
at 417.
417.
Id. at
99. Id.
Id.
100. Id.
at 418-19.
418-19. See generally
JELLUM &
HRiCIK, supra
supra note
note 77,
165-67; SINGER
Id. at
generally JELLUM
& HRlCIK,
77, atat 165-67;
SINGER &
& SINGER,
SINGER,
supra
expressio unius est exclusio
alterius).
supra note 77, §
§ 47:23 (discussing the
the principle
principle of
of expressio
exc1usio alterius).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/5
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 598 2009-2010

14

Epstein: Cops or Robbers? How Georgia's Defense of Habitation Statute App

2010]
20101

COPS OR ROBBERS?

599

10 1 But in a strange twist, the Hammock
Hammock
relevant to these subsections.
subsections. 101
court held that defense
defense of habitation
habitation did not apply because the
habitation-the defendant had no right to exclude
bedroom was not a habitation-the
0 2 Thus, the husband's breaking down
her husband from the room.
room.'102
the door was "not an unlawful entry into or attack upon Hammock's
Hammock's
0
3
habitation.,,103
Hammock knew if her husband's
habitation."' It is unclear whether Hammock
husband's
entry was lawful or
not, or whether such knowledge
knowledge figured into the
04
court's decision.'
decision. 104
interesting case interpreting
interpreting the statute,
In Robison v. State,
State, another interesting
the defendant came into his brother's house and attacked him with a
meat cleaver, at which point the brother beat the defendant
defendant with a
0 5 Convicted
aggravated assault, the defendant
pool cue. 1105
Convicted of aggravated
defendant asserted
asserted
that he was only trying to defend himself against the victim's
victim's
06
"unjustified
attack."'
The
defendant
argued
that
"unjustified attack.,,106 The defendant
section 16-3-23
"forbade the victim from using deadly force because he is the victim's
"forbade
brother."' 1 7 The court disagreed,
"subsection (2)[,] ...
brother.,,107
disagreed, explaining that "subsection
...
which excludes
excludes family members from its scope, applies only to
defense against one 'who
'who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has
unlawfully and forcibly entered
"'108 The court cited
entered the residence. ",lOS
cited
(1), which does not exclude family members, and held that
subsection (1),
10 9 The court's holding
subsection (2) was inapplicable
inapplicable to this case. 109
inapplicable against
against
implies that, even though subsection (2) may be inapplicable
an intruder who enters lawfully, subsections (1) and (3) would still
those subsections say
apply because, such as with family members,
0
entry."l
of
nothing about unlawfulness of entry. I 10

101.
Hammock, 592 S.E.2d at 418-19; see also
also JELLUM &
& HRICIK,
supra note 77, at
101. See Hammock,
HRICIK, supra
at 165-67;
165-67;
SINGER &
& SINGER,
SINGER, supra
supranote
SINGER
note 77, § 47:23.
102. Hammock,
Hammock, 592 S.E.2d at
at 419.
103.
103. Id.
Id.
104. See
Seeid.
id.
105. Robison
Robison v.
v. State,
State, 625
625 S.E.2d
533, 535
535 (Ga.
(Ga. Ct.
Ct. App.
App. 2006).
2006).
105.
S.E.2d 533,
106. Id.
Id.
107. Id.
Id. at
at 536.
536.
108.
16-3-23(2) (2007)).
lOS. Id.
Id. (quoting GA.
GA. CODE
CODE ANN. § 16-3-23(2)
(2007».
109. Id.
Id.
1983) (holding
110. See id
id. at 536. But see Fannin v. State, 299
299 S.E.2d 72,
72, 73 (Ga.
(Ga. Ct.
Ct. App. 19S3)
(holding that
... clearly shows that
defense of habitation
habitation applies because the
the "evidence ...
that the
the deceased used coercion
and threats
threats to gain
gain entry
entry into
into the defendant's home").
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To take a lesson from history, an old Georgia
Georgia case strongly
belief, rather than the
suggests that the defendant's reasonable
reasonable belief,
lawfulness or unlawfulness of the victim's entry, is all that should
lawfulness
McPherson v. State,
matter. III In McPherson
matter."'
State, the defendant shot a man on his
property
property because
because he thought the man was a burglar. It turned out,
however, that the defendant's
defendant's wife had allowed the man onto the
1 12
property.
property.ll2
The court, in examining the defendant's
defendant's conduct,
"[a] man cannot in general, be held accountable
accountable as a
reasoned that "[a]
criminal for failing to govern
criminal
govern himself by something of the existence
existence
ignorant."" 3 Further, the court noted that if the
of which he is ignorant."I13
defendant
defendant actually
actually believed that the man was a burglar, and the
circumstances justified
belief, then the case would not have
circumstances
justified such a belief,
"materially different from what it would have been, if [the man]
been "materially
burglar." 114 McPherson
McPherson directly implies that if a
had really been a burglar.,,114
homeowner shoots at a robber who turns out to be a police officer, a
homeowner
court should treat the situation no differently than if the victim had
actually been a robber.
3. Lawmakers' Goal

Having
analyzed the text, it is helpful to look at what the
Having analyzed
legislature
intended
accomplish by enacting the statute, or at least a
legislature intended to accomplish
15
part thereof. lIS
The Georgia
amended the defense of
of
Georgia legislature amended
habitation statute
statute in 2001 by adding subsection (2), suggesting
suggesting a
Il6
16
broader, occupant-oriented
"Make My Day
occupant-oriented interpretation.
The "Make
Bill,"
Bill," as the proposed amendment was called, was designed to allow
' 7 Thus,
homeowners
"shoot first and ask questions later.""
homeowners to "shoot
later."ll7
"allow people to defend their home without
subsection (2) would "allow
having to stop and think whether deadly force toward
toward an intruder
would meet the prior two [(subsections
[(subsections (1) and (3))] reasonableness
reasonableness
111. McPherson
(1857), available
availableat 1857
1857 WL 1938.
1938.
Ill.
McPherson v. State, 22 Ga. 478
478 (1857),
112.
Il2. Id.
Id. at *2.
113.
lB. Id.
Id. at*7.
*7.
114.
Il4. Id.
Id. at *8.
·8.
115.
SINGER, supra
lIS. See generally
generally SINGER
SINGER &
& SINGER,
supra note 77, § 48.1
48.1 (describing
(describing the use of legislative history
interpretation).
in statutory interpretation).
116. See Empie, supra
21, at 25-29.
supra note 21,
117.
at25.
117. Id.
Id. at
25.
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' 1 8 As
requirements.,,118
As Senator
Senator Eric
Eric Johnson, Senate
Senate District
District No.
No.1,
1,
requirements."

the bill's purpose
purpose is "to
"to allow
allow homeowners
homeowners to
to protect
protect
said, the
reasonably
or
themselves and their property
property when they know
reasonably know
know
themselves
'
19
that someone has trespassed
trespassed into their home."
home.,,119 Yet
Yet if the entry must
that
unlawful, the occupant
occupant would be
be required
required to engage
engage in120a
actually be unlawful,
intruders.
perceived
at
shooting
before
analysis
careful
careful risk-benefit
risk-benefit analysis before shooting at perceived intruders. 120
occupant does
does not react soon enough, she risks
risks
On one hand, if the occupant
1
12
raped,121 but if she acts
acts too quickly, she risks
murdered or raped,
being murdered
seems, therefore,
therefore, that the
felony. 122 It seems,
being convicted of a major felony.122
legislature
legislature wanted
wanted to enable home
home dwellers
dwellers to act simply
simply on
on
statute
the
and
interpreting
intruders,
at
reasonable belief in shooting
shooting intruders,
reasonable
123
legislative intent.
otherwise would conflict with legislative
intent. 123
otherwise
124
the Good
Good Old
Old Days
Days 124
B. Resisting Arrest in the

In interpreting
helpful to look briefly at Georgia's
Georgia's
interpreting the statute, it is helpful
between
common law principles,
principles, especially
especially in situations of conflict between
common
125
125
A
citizens and police.
A number
number of Georgia
Georgia cases
cases have dealt with
with
citizens
police
while
against
force
situations where a civilian
civilian used deadly
police

Id.at
at26.
118. [d.
118.
26.
119. Id.
[d. at
at 26-27
26-27 (emphasis
(emphasis added)
added) (quoting Telephone
Telephone Interview
Interview with
with Sen.
Sen. Eric Johnson, Senate
not intended
intended to
to allow
that the
bill was
was not
made to
to stress
stress that
was made
3, 2001)). This
This comment
No. I1 (Apr.
District No.
(Apr. 3,2001».
comment was
the bill
allow
(2)
subsection (2)
family
one another.
in subsection
language in
infer that
that the
the unlawfolness
unlawfulness language
Id.One
One may
may infer
shoot one
another. [d.
members to
to shoot
family members
external restrictions
restrictions on
not to
to impose
family shoot-outs and not
prevent hostile
was
to prevent
hostile family
impose external
on
designed specifically
specifically to
was designed
a robber
the occupant's
occupant's reasonable belief that a
the
robber has broken
broken into
into the home. See id
16, at
35-36.
BALKO, supra note
120. See BALKO,
120.
note 16,
at 35-36.
infra Part III.B.
llI.B.
121. See discussion infra
121.
Part III.A.
II.A.
discussion infra Part
122.
122. See discussion
21, at 26.
123. See Empie, supra note 21,
to forcefully
forcefully
the right
right to
citizen the
law rule
rule granting
of the
124. For a thorough examination of
the common
common law
granting aa citizen
1991).
an illegal
illegal arrest, see State v. Gardiner,
resist an
resist
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 571-75 (Utah 1991).
statutes with
application of
of statutes
50:2 (discussing
(discussing application
note 77,
77, § 50:2
125. See generally SINGER
SINGER && SINGER 2B,
2B, supra note
with
reference to
to common law principles). The authors
reference
authors note that "common-law principles have frequently
insist on
on criminal
criminal intent as an element of crimes under statutes which failed
as the
the basis
basis to
to insist
been invoked
invoked as
been
Id.
specifically to require it." [d
specifically
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26 Notably, courts do not necessarily
resisting arrest.
arrest.'126
necessarily give police
police any
127
broader protection
protection than
than ordinary
ordinary citizens.
citizens. 127
Davis v. State,
In Davis
State, a deputy officer came to the defendant's
defendant's house to
128
128
arrest him.
The deputy had a warrant but did not inform the
129
defendant
The defendant
defendant
defendant of the warrant or his intent to arrest. 129
resisted, ran "around
"around his house"
house" into the back door, and finally shot
the officer after the latter "attempt[ed]
"attempt[ed] to enter with a pistol in his
130
hand."'
hand.,,130 The court held that the defendant had a right to resist the
officer because
because he did not know of the officer's status or intent to
arrest, "and if [the officer] had died from the wounds inflicted by the
' 31
been murder."'
have been
not have
would not
defendant...... , it would
defendant
murder."l31
State.132 In
One frequently cited holding comes from Norton v. State.
Norton,
Norton, the defendant
defendant police officer, after a pursuit, shot a man when
the latter refused to hold up his hands and "brought his hand forward
'1 33 In part of its holding, the court elaborated on
with something in it."
it.,,133
on
the right to resist arrest:

The mere fact of an unlawful
unlawful arrest will not alone authorize the
killing of the officer making it. But if...
if ... the officer is about to
commit a felony upon the other party, or so acts and makes such
126. See,
See, e.g., Mullis v. State, 27 S.E.2d 91 (Ga. 1943); Shafer
Shafer v. State,
State, 20 S.E.2d 34 (Ga.
(Ga. 1942);
McBride
1925); Davis v.
State,
McBride v. State, 199
199 S.E. 153 (Ga. 1938); Paramore v. State, 129 S.E. 772 (Ga. 1925);
v. State,
44 S.E. 318 (Ga. 1887).
1887). Although
Although these
these cases are
are fairly
fairly old,
old, none of them
them has
has been
been overruled.
127. See, e.g.,
State, 169
169 S.E.
S.E. 315,
317 (Ga.
(Ga. Ct.
1933) (holding
citizen has
has aa
e.g., Walker
Walker v.v. State,
315, 317
Ct. App.
App. 1933)
(holding that
that aa citizen
force...
right to resist unlawful arrest "force
"force with force
... and if...
if ... he
he kills
kills an officer or
or private
private citizen
citizen who
who
joins
to effect
effect illegal
of no
no offense").
joins in
in an
an attempt
attempt to
illegal arrest...
arrest ... he
he isis guilty
guilty of
offense").
State, 4 S.E. 318,
128. Davis
Davis v. State,4
318, 318
318 (Ga. 1887).
129. !d.
Id.
Id.(reversing the lower court's conviction
130. !d.
conviction for "assault
"assault with
with intent
intent toto murder").
murder"). However,
However, the
the
court implied that if the defendant
defendant actually killed the officer, he would
would still be guilty
guilty of manslaughter,
but
but not murder.
murder. See id.
id.
131. Id.
319. The
The court,
court, in
dictum, doubted
131.
ld. at
at 319.
in dictum,
doubted whether the officer
officer in question had the right to effect
effect
the arrest. Id.
ld. at 318.
318.
132. Norton
State, 74
S.E. 759,
759, 760
760 (Ga. 1912).
1912). For
that cite
holding, see,
see, for
for
132.
Norton v.v. State,
74 S.E.
For other
other cases
cases that
cite the
the holding,
example,
Mullis v. State,
State, 27
State, 20
example, Mullis
27 S.E.2d 91,
91, 98-99 (Ga. 1943), Shafer v. State,
20 S.E.2d 34, 39
39 (Ga. 1942),
McBride
State, 199
199 S.E.
153, 156
1938), and
State, 129
129 S.E.
772, 777
777 (Ga. 1925).
1925).
and Paramore
McBride v. State,
S.E. 153,
156 (Ga.
(Ga. 1938),
Paramore v. State,
S.E. 772,
133. Norton,
Norton, 74 S.E.
S.E. at 761. But see Gresham v. State,
State, 27 S.E.2d 463, 464
464 (Ga. Ct.
Ct. App. 1943)
("[I]f...
("[I]f
... the facts and circumstances
circumstances surrounding
surrounding the accused
accused at the time he killed the deceased, were
harm, less than
than aa felony,
such only as would excite the fears of aa reasonable man
man that
that some bodily harm,
felony, was
was
imminent and
impending, this
not be a
a defense
to voluntary
manslaughter ....
....
(emphasis
imminent
and impending,
this would
would not
defense to
voluntary manslaughter
"(emphasis
added)).
added».
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a show of violence as
as to excite
excite in
in the
the person
person sought to be
be arrested
arrested
the
fears of
of a reasonable
reasonable man that a felony is about
about to be
be
the fears
of
committed upon him, and such
such person
person acts under the influence
influence of
committed
those
those fears,
fears, and
and not in a spirit
spirit of
of revenge,
revenge, he may protect
protect
although it may be necessary
necessary to slay the officer
officer for that
that
himself, although
134
purpose. 134
purpose.

"did not
question "did
defendant officer
The
The court
court noted
noted that
that the
the defendant
officer in
in question
not even
even
135
position."'
official
his
of
inform the
the person
person whom
whom he
he shot
shot of his official position.,,\35
inform
is another
Mullis v.
v. State is
another illustrative
illustrative case
case that
that expounds
expounds upon
upon the
the
36
136
"reasonable
fears"
doctrine
quoted
above.'
In
Mullis,
the
defendant
"reasonable fears" doctrine quoted above.
In Mullis, the defendant
pocket knife
stabbed
police
officer
jugular
vein
aa pocket
knife after
after
vein
with
jugular
in
the
officer
a
police
stabbed
37
137
him.'
arrest
to
effort
an
in
head
the
on
the
the officer
officer beat
beat the
the defendant
defendant on the head in an effort to arrest him.
kill to
that "a
trial judge
judge charged
charged the
the jury
jury that
"a person
person may
may kill
to prevent
prevent an
The trial
138
necessary."'
absolutely
and
reasonably
is
it
when
only
arrest
illegal arrest only when it is reasonably and absolutely necessary.,,138
illegal
error because
charge was
appeal, the
the court
court held
held that
that such
such aa charge
was error
because this
this
On appeal,
fears' of
of aa
principle of
the principle
instruction
eliminated the
of 'reasonable
'reasonable fears'
"wholly eliminated
instruction "wholly
felonious
deceased, aa resistance
resistance to
to which
which would
would
by the deceased,
assault by
felonious assault
'
1
39
an
when
constitute
The
court stated
stated that
that when an
The court
homicide.'
constitute justifiable homicide.,,139
if
"or if
manner, "or
in aa felonious
officer
felonious manner,
arrest but
but in
lawful arrest
make aa lawful
officer tries
tries to make
134. Norton,
Norton, 74 S.E. at 760 (emphasis
(emphasis added). The court's holding stems from the trial court's jury
charge that if the defendant
self-defense "against
manifestly intended by violence or
or
"against one who manifestly
defendant acted in self-defense
Id. The holding, affirming
surprise to commit a felony on his person,"
person," the homicide would be justified.
justified. Id.
affirming
the defendant's
defendant's conviction,
conviction, implies that the victim
victim could
could not have manifestly intended
intended to commit
commit a
Id.
officer because he was lawfully resisting an illegal
illegal arrest. !d.
felony on the officer
135.
Id.
135. Id.
261943) (citing Ga. Code of 1933 §§ 26-1011,
91, 98,
State, 27 S.E.2d
136. Mullis v. State,27
S.E.2d 91,
98, 100
\00 (Ga. 1943)
26-1011,26136.
codified in the two cited sections of the Georgia 1933 Code.
1012). The doctrine
doctrine of reasonable fears was codified
See id.
II, covering justifiable homicide, self defense, and defense of habitation, states
26-1011,
id. Section 26-10
that one is justified in committing homicide "against
"against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by
felony..,
violence or surprise, to commit a felony
... or against any persons who manifestly intend and endeavor,
in a riotous and tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of assaulting or
. . shall not
offenses. ...
offering personal violence"; section 26-1012 states that "a bare fear of any of those offenses
be sufficient to justify the killing.
circumstances were sufficient
sufficient to excite the
killing. It must appear that the circumstances
26-1012 (1935)
(1935) (emphasis added). For
26-\011, 26-10\2
For
.... "" Ga. Code of 1933 §§ 26-1011,
fears of a reasonable man ....
1997) and
more recent cases applying the doctrine, see Andrews v. State,
State, 480 S.E.2d 29, 30 (Ga. 1997)
"[t]he fears of a reasonable
Crawford
State, 480 S.E.2d 573,
reasonable man don't
don't
573, 575 (Ga. 1997). Notably, "[t]he
Crawford v. State,
v.
self-possessed." Johnson v.
mean the fears of a coward, but of a man reasonably courageous,
courageous, reasonably self-possessed."
WL 2207.
availableat
at 1884 WL
*8 (1884),
(1884), available
State, 72 Ga. 679, at *8
Mullis, 27 S.E.2d at 94-96.
137. Mullis,
at96.
Id. at
138. Id.
96.
100.
Seeid
139. See
id. at 100.
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circumstances are sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable
the circumstances
reasonable
man that such a felony is intended,
intended, and the offender
offender slays the
officer..,
officer
... to protect himself
himself from what is or what reasonably
reasonably
appears to be such a felonious assault, then
then..,
. . . the killing would be
appears
140
justifiable.,,140
justifiable."'
According to Mullis,
Mullis, then, even during a legal arrest, if the
reasonably appears to be felonious, the
officer's manner of arrest reasonably
him.' 41
killing him.141
in
justified
be
would
defendant
in killing
defendant
It is uncertain whether one can justify killing a police officer in a
no-knock raid on the grounds of resisting
resisting arrest. Perhaps because
because few
few
perfectly legal arrests appear
appear to be felonious, lethal resistance is
justified mostly in situations where the arrest (or manner thereof)
thereot) is
142
actually unlawful. I42
Moreover, in a vast majority of cases, the
143
defendants
But all in all, the
defendants know that they are resisting police. 143
law seems to balance the risk of committing a felony almost equally
equally
l44
144
between
As the
between an officer and a citizen in dubious encounters.
court in Dixon v. State
State said, "the arresting officer
officer is charged with the
duty of acting in confonnity
conformity with the law, and acts at his peril if he
violates it; and, likewise, the law having
having enjoined that the citizen
adjudication that the arrest is
quietly submit to lawful arrest,
his adjudication
1 45
peril.'
his
at
made
is
at his peril.,,145
unlawful

140. Id.
Id. at 98 (citing Ga. Code of 1933, §§
Norton for the
§§ 26-1011,
26-1011, 26-1012). The court also
also cited
cited Norton
the
"reasonable fears"
the preceding
preceding paragraph.
at 99.
99. The
"reasonable
fears" proposition
proposition quoted
quoted inin the
paragraph. Id.
Id. at
The same
same "reasonable
"reasonable fears"
standard applies to police officers who
who shoot at citizens.
citizens. Gordy
Gordy v.v. State,
State, 92 S.E.2d 737,
737, 739 (Ga. Ct.
Ct.
he lawfully
lawfully sought
App. 1956) (holding
(holding that aa police
police officer would
would be justified
justified inin killing aa person
person whom
whom he
sought
to arrest
arrest "under the fears of
of aa reasonable
reasonable man that aa felony was
was about toto be committed
committed upon
upon himself
himself or aa
fellow officer").
officer").
141.
Mullis, 27
Mullis knew that
141. See Mullis,
27 S.E.2d
S.E.2d at 98. The
The defendant inin Mullis
that the person
person he killed was
was aa police
police
Id. at
1925) (holding that
officer. Id.
at 94-96; see also Paramore
Paramore v. State,
State, 129 S.E.
S.E. 772, 777
777 (Ga. 1925)
that the
the
defendant may have
have been
been justified
justified in killing
killing an officer when
when the latter lawfully
lawfully tried to
to arrest the
the
defendant for aa misdemeanor
misdemeanor but
but then unlawfully shot
shot at the
the defendant when he tried to run away). But
see Glaze v. State, 120 S.E.
S.E. 530,
530, 533 (Ga. 1923) ("If aa person
person kill
kill [sic]
[sic] an officer to
to prevent
prevent the
the latter
from lawfully arresting
arresting him in aa lawful way,
way, the crime
crime is murder.");
murder."); Brown v. State,
State, 69 S.E. 45,
45, 48
48 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1910) (holding
(holding that
that mere menacing and
and threatening
threatening language or surroundings can only
only mitigate
victim-a town marshal,
aa killing
killing from murder
murder to manslaughter,
manslaughter, but
but ifif the victirn-a
marshal, in this case--had
case-had aa "pointed
"pointed
... coupled with the
you,"'
pistol ...
the statement
statement 'God
'God dani
damn you, II will
will kill you,
'" the killing
killing would
would be justifiable).
justifiable).
142. See,
See, e.g.,
27 S.E.2d
S.E.2d at
99-100; Paramore,
129 S.E.
S.E. at
at 777.
777.
e.g., Mullis,
Mullis, 27
at 99-100;
Paramore, 129
See, e.g.,
Glaze, 120
143. See,
e.g., Glaze,
120 S.E.
S.E. atat 533; Perano v.v. State,
State, 307
307 S.E.2d 64, 66 (Ga. Ct.
Ct App. 1983).
144. See Dixon
Dixon v. State,
State, 76
76 S.E.
794, 794-95 (Ga. Ct.
Ct. App.
144.
S.E. 794,794-95
App. 1912).
1912).
Id.
145. !d.
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C.
C. Defense ofHabitation
Habitation Applied
There is
is very
little Georgia
addressing what
There
very little
Georgia case
case law
law addressing
what happens
happens
when
police during
during aa no-knock
no-knock raid
and
when aa home
home dweller
dweller shoots
shoots at
at police
raid and
kills
kills an officer. 146 However,
However, there
there are
are some
some cases
cases where the
defendant, after
after attacking
to assert
assert defense
of
defendant,
attacking police,
police, tried
tried to
defense of
147
147
habitation. These
These cases,
below, offer
offer aa glimpse
glimpse into
the
habitation.
cases, described
described below,
into the
courts' potential
potential approach
approach to
problem and
may be
cited for
courts'
to the
the problem
and may
be cited
for
precedent when
when the
the no-knock
no-knock raid
issue comes
to the
the forefront.
precedent
raid issue
comes to
forefront.
v. State, aa police
officer came
came to
defendant's house
house in
in
In Leach v.
police officer
to the
the defendant's
148
response
to
a
"wife
beating
incident."
Before
the
officer
came
in,
response to a "wife beating incident.,,148 Before the officer came in,
the defendant
took aa sawed-off
shotgun, pointed
it at
at the
the officer,
and
the
defendant took
sawed-off shotgun,
pointed it
officer, and
149
said "I'm
"I'm going
going to
kill yoU.,,149
you."
The
officer retreated, and the
said
to kill
The officer
lSO
150 In response
defendant was
response to
the
defendant
was charged
charged with
with aggravated
aggravated assault.
assault.
to the
defendant's defense
defense of
of habitation
habitation claim,
claim, the
court held
that "there
defendant's
the court
held that
"there
was sufficient
sufficient evidence
for the
the jury
jury to
to find
either that
that the
officer did
did
was
evidence for
find either
the officer
151
not make
unlawful entry
entry or
or was
not attempting
attempting to
to make
make one."
not
make an
an unlawful
was not
one.,,151 It
It
is not
whether the
stressed the
the lack
entry, or
or the
the lack
is
not clear
clear whether
the court
court stressed
lack of
of an
an entry,
lack
52
entry.1
unlawful
an
of
an
unlawful
entry.
152
of

146.
146. However, there may be a ruling on the matter in the near future. In Fair
Fair v. State, the defendants
defendants
charged with murdering a police
were charged
police officer during the exercise of a no-knock warrant.
warrant. Fair v. State,
664 S.E.2d 227,
229-30 (Ga. 2008).
16227, 229-30
2008). The defendants
defendants asserted immunity
immunity based on GA.
GA. CODE ANN.
ANN. § 163-23, § 16-3-24,
16-3-24, and § 16-3-24.2
16-3-24.2 (2007).
Fair,664 S.E.2d
3-23,
(2007). Fair,
S.E.2d at 230. The court remanded the case back for
a pre-trial determination
detennination of whether
whether the defendants should be immune
immune from prosecution. Id
Id.
infra Part II.C.
H.C.
147. See discussion
discussion infra
148. Leach v. State, 239 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 177, 178 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
Id.at 179.
149. Id.atI79.
150. !d.
Id.
ISO.
151. Id.
Id.at 180.
151.
180.
152. See id.
id In
victim's
In denying
denying the defense of habitation, it is often unclear whether courts stress the victim's
thereof. For example, in Stobbart
Stobbart v.
v. State,
State, the defendant
lack of entry
entry or lawfulness
lawfulness thereof.
defendant shot a guest
guest after an
argument. Stobbart
Stobbart v. State, 533 S.E.2d 379,
379, 381 (Ga. 2000). The court held that defense
defense of habitation
"[section] 16-3-23
terminate an 'unlawful
did not apply because "[section]
16-3-23 authorizes
authorizes use of force to tenninate
'unlawful entry into or
attack upon a habitation.'
habitation.' The statute is clearly concerned with the use of deadly force to counter entry,
unavailable
or attempted entry, into the home."
home." Id.
Id. at 383.
383. The court further noted that the defense is unavailable
"when the
the victim
victim is
guest in
in the
home." Id.;
see also
also Lee
Lee v.
State, 415
290, 293 (Ga. Ct.
Ct. App.
"when
is aa guest
the home."
Id.; see
v. State,
415 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 290,
1992) (holding that defense
1992)
defense of habitation did not apply where the defendant
defendant invited the victim
victim into his
home because use of deadly force is justified
justified when the occupant "reasonably
"reasonably believes that the entry is
made or attempted for the purpose of committing a felony therein"); Terrell v. Hester, 355 S.E.2d 97,
97, 99
(Ga. Ct. App. 1987)
1987) (holding that section 16-3-23 did not apply where the defendant
defendant beat
beat the plaintiffplaintiffpremises--outside the house because
who may have been lawfully on the premises-{)utside
because no entry actually occurred).
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defendant was charged with aggravated
In Price
Price v. State,
State, the defendant
aggravated
assault upon a peace officer
officer because he shot at the police after they
they
153
153
defendant asserted
asserted
pursued him and broke into his apartment. The defendant
defense of habitation
habitation under section 16-3-23.154
16_3_23. 154 First, the court found
155
that the officers'
officers' entry into the apartment
apartment was lawful. 155
Next, the
court found that the defendant's shooting may not have been justified
justified
under section 16-3-23,
16-3-23, but the court only cited subsections (1) and (3)
156
(then subsections (1) and (2»
(2)) for this lack of justification. 156
The
court held that the defendant's "knowledge
"knowledge of the identity of the
individuals as officers and his justification
justification for firing on them were
57 The court's
issues which
which were properly
properly submitted to the jury."'
jury.,,157
court's
and
reasoning
holding
directly
imply
that
if
the
defendant
did
not
reasoning
know the officers'
officers' status,
justified in shooting at them
them
status, and if he was justified
under subsections (1) and (3),
(3), then the actual lawfulness or
58
irrelevant.'1158
be irrelevant.
would be
entry
officers'
the
of
unlawfulness
officers' entry would
unlawfulness
A Georgia Supreme Court case, Washington
Washington v. State,
State, cites both
159
160
16
0
Davis
Norton
and provides some illumination. of the
Davis
and Norton
161
161
Washington, the defendant
In Washington,
defendant threatened to "blow the
issue.
policeman's
policeman's brains out" after the officers drove up to his house in
in
162
162
response
to
a
call.
After
hearing
more
obscenities
and
threats,
the
response
cal1.
police pursued the defendant
defendant into the house, where he shot and killed
163
one of the officers
officers and later bragged about it. 163
The court held that
"the suspect
suspect cannot withdraw
withdraw into his house, shoot and kill one of the
153. Price
Price v.
v. State,
334 S.E.2d
711, 715
715 (Ga.
(Ga. Ct. App.
App. 1985).
153.
State, 334
S.E.2d 711,
1985).
154. Id
[d.
155.
155. Id.
!d.
156. Id.
(3) do not mention
GA. CODE
156.
[d. at 716. Recall that subsections (1)
(1) and (3)
mention unlawfulness of entry. GA.
ANN.
16-3-23 (2007);
1I.A.
also supra
ANN. § 16-3-23
(2007); see also
supra Part
Part II.A.
157.
Price,334 S.E.2d at
157. Price,
at 716.
158.
See id.;
id.; but
cf Parrish
355 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 682,
(Ga. Ct. App.
App. 1987)
1987) (holding
the
158. See
but cf
Parrish v.v. State,
State, 355
682, 685
685 (Ga.
(holding that
that the

defense of habitation
habitation statute
statute did
did not
not apply where
where the
the defendant pointed
pointed aa gun atat police
police officers
officers because
there was
was "no
evidence that
that defendant
attempting 'to
'to prevent
prevent or
[the officers']
or terminate
officers'] unlawful
there
"no evidence
defendant was
was attempting
terminate [the
unlawful
defendant
entry into or attack upon aa habitation" (alteration
(alteration in original)).
original». In Parrish,
Parrish, however, the
the defendant
knowingly threatened
officers when
came upon,
knowingly
threatened the
the officers
when they
they came
upon, but
but did
did not
not enter
enter or attempt to enter, his
his
Id.at 683.
marijuana patch. [d.
683.
159. Davis
Davis v.
v. State,
State, 44 S.E.
S.E. 318
318 (Ga.
(Ga. 1887);
1887); see also discussion
discussion supra
supraPart
Part H.B.
159.
II.B.
160. Norton
Norton v.v. State,
State, 74
74 S.E.
S.E. 759 (Ga. 1912); see also discussion supra
supra Part
Part H.B.
II.B.
161.
161. Washington v.v. State, 263
263 S.E.2d 152, 154 (Ga. 1980).
162.
Id.
at
162. [d.
at 153.
163.
163. Id
!d.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/5
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 606 2009-2010

22

Epstein: Cops or Robbers? How Georgia's Defense of Habitation Statute App

COPS OR ROBBERS?

2010)
20101

607

officers who enters thereafter
self-defense."' 64 The
thereafter and then claim self-defense."I64
habitation
court cited only subsections
subsections (1) and (3)
(3) of the defense
defense of habitation
statute for its holding, and did not mention that the entry must
165
The court also distinguished Davis
Davis on the
actually be unlawful. I65
grounds that in Davis,
"the
defendant
Davis, "the defendant did not know that the person
making the arrest was a law enforcement
enforcement officer.,,166
officer."'1 66 Thus,
Washington seems to imply that if the defendant
Washington
defendant did not know that
the person in his house was a 67police
police officer, he might have been
been
167
officer.'
the
shooting
in
justified
the officer.
Importantly, the above cases deal with rather morally clear-cut
clear-cut
situations
situations where the defendants
defendants knew that police were after them and
68 Moreover,
law.'168
purposefully, even maliciously, tried to resist the law.
1 69
primary issue.
the primary
really the
not really
was not
the unlawfulness
entry was
issue. 169
unlawfulness of the entry
scenario where a homeowner mistakenly
However, in a scenario
mistakenly shoots at
reasonably believing them to be robbers, the
police raiders, reasonably
unlawfulness of entry is bound to come into focus, and the moral
unlawfulness
innocence
the shooter is likely to affect a court's
ofthe
court's decision.
innocence of
III. PROPOSAL:
BALANCING RISKS,
PROPOSAL: BALANCING
RISKS, AVOIDING
AVOIDING COLLISIONS

Courts should hold that the entry does not need to actually
actually be
especially in
unlawful for the defense of habitation statute to apply, especially
cases
language of the statute is
cases of no-knock police raids. The language
170
unclear,
unclear,170 but even if it leans towards
towards an actual unlawfulness
requirement, in the words of the United States
States Supreme
Supreme Court, this is
17
not "the
"the end of the matter."
matter.,,171' As previously
previously described, an actual
164. Id.
Id. at 154.
165. Id.
165.
Id.
166. Id.
Davis v.
State, 4 S.E.
S.E. 318
318 (Ga. 1887)).
1887)).
Id. (citing
(citing Davis
v. State,4
1980).
167. Washington
Washington v.v. State, 263 S.E.2d
S.E.2d 152,
152, 154 (Ga. 1980).
168. See id.
at 153;
153; see also Price
Price v.
v. State,
711, 715
id. at
State, 334 S.E.2d 711,
715 (Ga. Ct. App.
App. 1980); Leach v. State,
239
S.E.2d 177,
177, 179
179 (Ga. Ct.
Ct. App.
1977).
239 S.E.2d
App. 1977).
Washington, 263
also Price,
179169. See Washington,
263 S.E.2d atat 154; see also
Price, 334
334 S.E.2d
S.E.2d at 715; Leach, 239 S.E.2d
S.E.2d at 17980.
170. See discussion supra
supra Part H.A.
II.A.I.1.
171. United
Inc., 513 U.S.
(1994) (holding
17!.
United States
States v.v. X-Citement Video, inc.,
U.S. 64, 68 (1994)
(holding that even though
though the
statute's
statute's "most
"most natural grammatical meaning"
meaning" disposes of
of aa particular
particular knowledge
knowledge requirement,
requirement, such
such a
requirement
"anomalies" and
requirement must be
be imposed to avoid
avoid "anomalies"
and because
because "some form of
of scienter isis to be implied
implied
in aa criminal
criminal statute even if not expressed").
expressed").
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unlawfulness requirement
unlawfulness
requirement would directly conflict
conflict with legislative
legislative
intent by forcing occupants, at their peril, to think long and hard
72 But the most important
important reason for
before defending themselves. I72
not requiring an unlawful entry, and the focus of the discussion
requirement would place an enormous risk of
of
below, is that such a requirement
injury, prison, or death on those who are the least culpable
culpable and the
73 Courts can also effectively mitigate any
least prepared. 1I73
effectively
negative
consequences
consequences of allowing occupants
occupants to shoot upon reasonable
174
belief.174
belief.
A.
You
A. What You Don
Don't't Know May Kill You
If the entry
entry must actually be unlawful, regardless of the occupant's
occupant's
reasonable
belief, what would happen to a person who mistakenly
mistakenly
reasonable belief,
shoots and kills an officer? This is literally an issue of life and death.
In Fair
State, the defendants shot and killed a police officer during
Fair v. State,
175
a no-knock raid. I75
The state charged the defendants with murder and
circumstance that
sought the death penalty based on the aggravating circumstance
I76
1
76
the victim was a peace officer. The court held that under Georgia
Georgia
law, the defendant does not have to know that the person killed was a
177
police officer to be eligible
Under Fair,
Fair,it is
eligible for the death penalty. 177
16-3-23 were
were to
scary to imagine what would happen if section 16-3-23
require actual unlawful entry.
by
Imagine an occupant
occupant who wakes
wakes up in the dark of night by
thunderous
pounding
at
the
door,
jumbled
of
thunderous
jumbled shouts, and the crack of
breaking
breaking wood. Startled and overcome with fear, she reaches for the
17
gun kept for protection and shoots at the perceived intruders. 178
' As
soon as the bullet leaves the barrel, she has done her deed, but society
is not yet free to judge her action. Her innocence or guilt, life or
172.
supraPart Il.A.3.
I.A.3.
172. See discussion supra
173.
LI.A-C.
173. See discussion infra Part III.A-C.
174. See discussion infra
llI.D.
infra Part III.D.
175.
175. Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227, 229-30 (Ga. 2008).
176. /d.
Id. at 229-31.
229-3\. A jury may impose a death sentence
sentence if it finds at least one statutory
statutory aggravating
aggravating
CODE ANN.
ANN. § 17-10-30
17-10-30 (2008). Killing a police officer is one of those circumstances.
circumstance. GA. CODE
circumstances.
[d.
Id.
Fair,664 S.E.2d at 233.
177. Fair,
Rutlege, supra
21, at 629-30.
178. A somewhat similar example
example may be found in RutJege,
supra note 21,
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death, depend not on her but on who is behind
behind the door. If they are
robbers, then her shooting at them is completely
completely justified, and even
79
laudable. 1179
If the intruders
intruders are police, then she is the worst criminal
180
possible in the eyes of the law. 180
After all, as Justice
Justice Brennan
Brennan stated,
the death penalty is reserved
crimes."' 8 1 It
reserved only for the "most
"most heinous crimes.,,181
is strange and chilling to think, therefore, that whether you are a
perfectly
perfectly law-abiding citizen or the most heinous
of criminals
criminals
182
control.
your
beyond
depends on factors completely beyond your control. 182
B. Are They Real or Fake?
Fake?
Requiring
Requiring that an entry actually be unlawful
unlawful will force occupants
to throw down their guns as soon as they see a badge or hear the
word "police!"
surrender will expose many
"police!" Yet such immediate surrender
people
to
a
great
risk
of
harm.
Cases
of police
impersonation are
people
police impersonation
rampant throughout the country, and brazen criminals sometimes
sometimes like
183
COpS.,,183 For example,
example, in
to "disarm
"disarm their victims by pretending to be cops.
Pennsylvania case, a serial killer used a police disguise to gain
one Pennsylvania
gain
entry into a woman's home, then raped her and strangled her with a
84 More recently in Alabama, two men kicked in the door
drape cord. 1184
of an apartment
apartment claiming to be narcotics
narcotics agents, hit the occupant
occupant in
prescription
the head with a gun, then stole her money and prescription

179.
179. See GA.
GA. CODE
CODE ANN. § 16-3-23
16-3-23 (2007).
180.
180. See Kennedy
Kennedy v. Louisiana,
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct.
Ct. 2641,
2641, 2665 (2008)
(2008) (stating
(stating that the death penalty "must be
be
also Furman v.
(1972) (Brennan,
reserved for the
the worst of
of crimes");
crimes"); see also
v. Georgia, 408
408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972)
(Brennan, J.,
concurring).
181. Furman,
Furman,408 U.S. at 286
181.
286 (Brennan, J., concurring).
182.
182. One may
may think that other defenses, like self-defense, would be available
available to
to such aa person.
However, the
the self-defense
self-defense statute
suffers from
from the
the same
same ambiguity
ambiguity regarding
regarding unlawfulness
unlawfulness as
as defense
However,
statute suffers
defense of
of
16-3habitation and, furthermore, requires the
the perceived
perceived danger
danger to be imminent. See GA.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-321(a)
(2007) (stating
(stating that
person is
is justified
force against
against another's
use of
of unlawful
21
(a) (2007)
that aa person
justified inin using
using force
another's "imminent
"imminent use
unlawful
force");
force"); see also discussion supra
supra Part
Part I.B.
I.B.
183. Colleen
Colleen Long,
Long, Police
ImpersonatorsFlash
Flash aa Badge,
Fool aa Victim, AsSOCIATED
ASSOCIATED PREss
PRESS ALERT
ALERT
183.
Police Impersonators
Badge, Fool
(Conn.),
13, 2008
2008 (quoting
(quoting Dr. Naftali
lead psychologist
the New
Center for
for
(Conn.), July
July 13,
Naftali Bertill,
Berrill, aa lead
psychologist atat the
New York
York Center
Neuropsychology and
and Forensic
Forensic Behavioral
Science); see also
also BALKO,
16, at
20; Kristan
Neuropsychology
Behavioral Science);
BALKO, supra
supra note
note 16,
at 20;
Lures Police
Impersonators,WASH. TIMES
Cl, available
Trugman, Power
Power Lures
Police Impersonators,
TIMES (D.C.), Sept.
Sept. 10, 1999,
1999, atat CI,
available at
1999 WLNR
412267.
1999
WLNR412267.
Illinois Inmate Charged
Charged in 1979 Killing:
Serial Killer Timothy
184. Manuel Gamiz Jr., Illinois
Killing: Suspected Serial
Krajcir Raped,
Raped, Choked Berks County Woman,
Woman, Police
CALL (Allentown,
(Allentown, Pa.),
12,
Krajcir
Police Say, MORNING
MORNING CALL
Pa.), Jan.
Jan. 12,
2008, available
available at 2008 WLNR
WLNR 675980.
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85 In another case, two Los Angeles ex-policemen
medications.1
ex-policemen were
medications. 185
"home-invasion robberies
convicted of committing "home-invasion
robberies that were
designed
designed to look like legitimate
legitimate police searches of homes and
186 And in Georgia, "men posing as police
businesses.,,186
police forced their
businesses."'
...and shot and wounded a thirteen-year-old
thirteen-year-old
way into an apartment ...
187
girl.,,187
girl."'
Corporal Ilana
spokeswoman for the Gwinnett
Hana Spellman, the spokeswoman
County Police Department, warned
warned the public about police
188
188
sometimes use
She said that although police sometimes
impersonators.
unmarked
unmarked cars and wear plain clothes, "usually we're going to
announce ourselves and allow someone to come to the door before
no-knock entry, how
we're going to breach
breach a doorway.,,189
doorway."' 189 But in a no-knock
will a disoriented occupant identify the intruders? In
In the few seconds
of sheer terror, will she be able to correctly
correctly discern the real police
from potentially
potentially dangerous impersonators?
impersonators?

C. Sharing
C.
Sharing the Risk
Pretenders
Pretenders are out there, but most police are real and law-abiding,
and it may seem unfair to allow jittery occupants to kill honest
officers
officers who are simply following their duties. Though police
certainly
certainly deserve all the protection the law allows, civilians
civilians should
should
185. Holly
Police Version
Version of Story, DECATUR
DECATUR DAILY
185.
Holly Hollman,
Hollman, Alleged Fake Narc
Narc Agents Deny Police
(Ala.),
availableat
at 2008
(Ala.), June
June 5, 2008,
2008, available
2008 WLNR
WLNR 10609127.
LBPD Officer
186. Wendy
Wendy Thomas
Thomas Russel,
Russel, Ferguson
Ferguson Brothers
Brothers Convicted of Felonies;
Felonies; COURT:
COURT: LBPD
Found
Counts of Conspiracy
Conspiracy and One Firearm
Firearm Charge,
Charge, LONG
LoNG BEACH
BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM
PRESS-TELEGRAM
Found Guilty on Two Counts
(Cal.),
A, available
at 2008
(CaL), Jan. 31,
31, 2008, at IIA,
available at
2008 WLNR 1806857.
Hispanics in Nine Robberies,
Robberies, ATLANTA
187. Andria
Andria Simmons, Fake
Fake Cops Target
Target Hispanics
ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
J.-CONST., July 9,
2008,
B3, available
at 2008 WLNR 12838445.
12838445.
2008, at 83,
available at
188. Id
Id
189.
189. Id.
/d. (emphasis
(emphasis added).
added). For other recent examples
examples of
of criminals impersonating
impersonating police, see John
John
Annese,
That Cops
Cops Show ID Cautions
Commissioner: Home Invasion
Officers
Annese, Insist That
Cautions Police
Police Commissioner:
Invasion by Fake
Fake Officers
Points
Vigilant, STATEN ISLAND
Points Up the Need for
for Islanders
Islanders to be Vigilant,
ISLAND ADVANCE
AovANCE (N.Y.), Sept.
Sept. 5, 2008, at
A01, available
at 2008 WLNR 16858478; Matt
Artists Strikes,
Strikes, HARTFORD
AOI,
available at
Matt Burgard,
Burgard, Pair
Pair of Scam Artists
6, 2008, at B3, available
availableat
at 2008
Say
COURANT (Conn.), June
June 6,2008,
2008 WLNR
WLNR 10727089; Amber Craig, Police
Police Say
Burglar
Posedas
as FBI Agent, PRESS-REGISTER
Al, available
Burglar Posed
PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile, Ala.),
Ala.), Oct.
Oct. 16,
16, 2008, atat AI,
available at 2008
Real Cop
Cop Nabs 33 Fakes,
Fakes, MEMPHIS
WLNR 20108044;
20108044; Hank
Hank Dudding &
& Jody Callahan, Police:
Police: Real
MEMPHIS COM.
10, 2008, at
available at 2008
APPEAL (Tenn.),
(Tenn.), Oct. 10,2008,
at B2,
B2, available
2008 WLNR 19347604; Man Robbed by Bogus
Police
COUNTY STAR
STAR (Cal.),
14, 2010,
2010, available
available at 2010
2010
Police Officers in Home Invasion,
Invasion, VENTURA COUNTY
(CaL), Jan.
Jan. 14,
PoliceImpersonators
Break into a House,
2010,
WLNR 840502; Police
Impersonators Break
House, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb.
Feb. 4,4,2010,
22, available
availableat
at 2010
WLNR 2353532.
atat 22,
2010 WLNR
2353532.
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190 After all, police are
not shoulder all the risks of a deadly encounter. 190
significantly more prepared
prepared to deal with deadly situations and to
significantly
191 For example, a typical SWAT
SWAT
avoid harm than private citizens. 191
team is equipped
equipped with, among other things, battle fatigues,
bulletproof helmets and vests, gas masks, boot knives, and military
92 Also, officers who conduct raids are
grade assault weapons. 1192
193
hour of
one hour
least one
at least
of training
training per
per month.
month. 193
required to undergo
undergo at
Compare that to a startled
experience and an
Compare
startled civilian with no martial experience
194
old revolver who just woke up or came out of the shower. 194
As
occupants to
Balko notes, it is unrealistic and unfair to expect civilian occupants
"show remarkable
remarkable poise
poise and
and composure,
composure, exercise
"show
exercise good judgment, and
hold their fire, even as teams of armed assailants are swarming
swarming their
95
homes."' Police are in much better
homes.,,195
better shape to evaluate and minimize
96
home unannounced.1
unannounced. 196
the risks of breaking into aa home

D.
andJustice
D. Life and
Justice for All
Allowing
Allowing homeowners to defend themselves in good faith against
97
take. 1197
course to
right and
is the
no-knock police raids is
the right
and reasonable
reasonable course
to take.
However, the legislature
legislature and the courts may be put off by the
98
collision.'198
resulting legal collision.
After all, during a no-knock entry, both
the police and home dwellers would be able to legally kill each
each
199
199
other.
Legalizing
Legalizing such deadly encounters will not solve the
BALKO, supra
supra note
note 16,
16, at
at 35-36.
35-36.
190. See BALKO,
191. [d.
Id.
191.
Id.at 5; see also ROBERT
ROBERT SNOW,
EXPLOSIVE FACE-OFFS
WITH AMERICA'
AMERICA'SS
192. [d.
SNOW, SWAT TEAMS: EXPLOSIVE
FACE-OFFS WITH
DEADLIEST CRIMINALS
(1996) (describing
(describing weapons
and other
other equipment
DEADLIEST
CRIMINALS 99-121
99-121 (1996)
weapons and
SWAT
used by
by SWAT
equipment used
teams). But
But note that
that "SWAT officials
officials are armed with much
much more destructive
destructive and dangerous equipment
equipment
officers." [d.
Id.at 103.
than are
are regular police officers."
193. BALKO,
BALKO, supra
supra note
note 16, atat 36.
36.
supra iNTRODUCTION;
INTRODUCTION; see also
also United States v. Banks,
31, 33, 39 (2003)
194. See supra
Banks, 540 U.S. 31,33,39
(2003) (finding
that, after announcing
announcing themselves, fifteen
fifteen to twenty seconds
seconds was long
long enough for police toto wait
wait before
entering
entering even though the defendant was inin the shower and did not
not hear the
the police announce
announce themselves);
themselves);
BALKO, supra
BALKO,
supra note
note 16, atat 35-36.
35-36.
195. BALKO,
BALKO, supra
supra note
note 16, atat 36.
36.
Id.
196. [d.
HA-C.
197. See discussion supra
supra Part
Part II1A-C.
198. See Butler, supra
supra note
note 22,
22, atat 451.
199. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-20(b)
17-4-20(b) (2008)
CODE ANN.
(2008) (allowing
(allowing use
use of deadly force by
by police
police "when the
the
officer reasonably believes that the
the suspect poses
poses an immediate threat of physical
physical violence
violence to the
the officer
officer
or
of Atlanta,
510 S.E.2d
65-66 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1998)
1998) (reversing
(reversing an
an officer's
officer's
or others");
others"); Allen
Allen v.v. City
City of
Atlanta, 510
S.E.2d 64,
64, 65-66
Ct. App.
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problem, but our justice system should not blame and punish the
police
of
police or private citizens for taking reasonable actions in pursuit of
self-preservation.
0 Perhaps, as Balko said, "the
self-preservation.22oo
"the fault lies with the
bad public policy that puts police officers
officers in such unnecessarily
unnecessarily
'2°
1
perilous
situations.,,201 But adequate protection
protection of both police and
perilous situations.'
citizens can be achieved
achieved without eliminating
eliminating no-knock raids
unlawfulness requirement
requirement
altogether and without imposing an actual unlawfulness
202
in section 16_3_23.
16-3-23.202
In construing the defense of habitation
habitation statute,
statute, courts should apply
apply
an objective reasonableness
reasonableness standard
standard in assessing the defending
occupant's
occupant's apprehension of danger, as is the case with self20 3
defense.
The courts should then enunciate the circumstances
circumstances under
defense. 203
which an occupant's belief that robbers are invading her house is
204 Thereby, officers in preparation for a noobjectively
objectively reasonable.204
knock raid would bear those circumstances
circumstances in mind and would do
their best to avoid inciting any reasonable apprehension
apprehension of danger in
in
the occupant. And if worse comes to worst, the court will at least
have a clear and fair framework
framework for deciding whether the occupant
occupant
was justified
justified in shooting.
To determine
objectively reasonable
reasonable
determine whether an occupant had an objectively
belief that her house was being robbed, courts may find it helpful to

suspension for shooting
approaching car's driver when the latter failed to stop and drove towards
suspension
shooting at an approaching
towards
supra note 16, at 35 (describing how even faultless officers will fire
BALKO, supra
fIre back
back at raid targets
targets
officer); BALKO,
in order to protect their
their own lives).
35.
200. See BALKO,
BALKO, supra
supra note 16, at 35.
Id.
201. [d.
id.at 26-27
202. But see id.
26-27 (suggesting
(suggesting that no-knock raids are generally
generally ineffective
ineffective and do not serve
their ostensible purpose).
203. See Lewis v. State,
515 S.E.2d
"subjective
State, 51S
S.E.2d 382, 383 (Ga. 1999) (holding that in self-defense, the "subjective
fears of a particular defendant are irrelevant"); Nelson v. State, 331 S.E.2d 554, 557 (Ga.
(Ga. 1985)
1985) (holding
that when a person asserts self-defense, his actions are governed
governed by a reasonable
reasonable person standard); Bell
v. Smith,
Smith, 488
488 S.E.2d
91, 93 (Ga.
(Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
("The question
question is not whether [the defendant]
actually
v.
S.E.2d 91,
1997) (''The
defendant] actually
feared the occupants
reasonable person
occupants of the truck, but rather whether an objective reasonable
person would have
believed [the person protected]
protected] to be in imminent danger."). For Georgia's self-defense
self-defense statute,
statute, see GA.
CODE ANN.
ANN.§ 16-3-21
16-3-21 (2007).
(2007).
204. Because
Because the defense
defense of habitation
habitation statute
statute allows for immunity from prosecution,
prosecution, the court, not
the
will decide
decide whether
whether the
the circumstances
circumstances in
belief
the jury,
jury, will
in any given case create an
an objectively
objectively reasonable
reasonable belief
in the occupant
criminals were invading
(Ga.
occupant that criminals
invading her home. See Bunn
BUDD v. State, 667 S.E.2d 605,
605, 608 (Ga.
2008); see also
also Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227,
227, 230 (Ga. 2008).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/5
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 612 2009-2010

28

Epstein: Cops or Robbers? How Georgia's Defense of Habitation Statute App

2010]
20101

COPS OR
OR ROBBERS?
ROBBERS?
COPS

613

0 5 For example,
consider
consider several
several factors.
factors.2205
example, the
the defendant's
defendant's general
general
defendant is a previously
previously convicted
convicted
behavior may
may be
be relevant:
relevant: if the defendant
behavior
engaged in habitual
habitual and
and serious criminal
criminal activity, he may
felon or is engaged
be more
more aware
aware of
of the possibility
possibility of
of a police raid and would be
be more
2
°6 Also
likely to knowingly
knowingly kill an officer than an
an innocent
innocent person. 206
important are the time
time of
of day and the character
character of
of the
neighborhood-if it is nighttime, or
or if there
there have been previous home
neighborhood-if
occupants might
invasions in the area, the
the occupants
might be
be more likely to think that
invasions
207
in?07 Finally, the
the method of entry should
should be
are breaking
breaking in.
robbers are
20
8
carefully examined.
examined?08 If police
police use loudspeakers
loudspeakers or sirens to alert the
carefully
occupant
presence; if they wear uniforms
uniforms rather than plain
plain
occupant of their presence;
clothes; and if they enter in an organized rather than a "violent
"violent and
tumultuous,,209
the occupant
occupant would be less likely to
tumultuous" 20 9 manner, then 21
0
2lo
robbers.
for
police
mistake the
for robbers.
reasonable belief would
guidelines as to what constitutes
constitutes reasonable
would
Clear guidelines
would
alleviate
tensions
in
and
field.
Police
be
the
court
in
both
alleviate
encouraged to evaluate
evaluate more seriously whether the occupant
occupant might
encouraged
of
reasonably mistake them for robbers, thereby reducing the chance of
211
2 11 Furthermore, trigger-happy occupants
a deadly encounter.
Furthermore, trigger-happy occupants would
also be kept in check. After all, innocent landlords, deliverymen,
postal workers,
workers, and salesmen do not forcefully break into houses at
212
212
belief
reasonable belief
night. And if a shooting does occur, the objective reasonable

205. For
For example, courts
courts consider several
several factors to determine whether aa warrantless,
warrantless, non-consensual
non-consensual
th Cir. 1987).
810 F.2d
F.2d 1034,
1034, 1037 (11
Standridge, 810
entry isis justified.
justified. E.g.,
United States
States v.v. Standridge,
(11th
entry
E.g., United
(2001) (holding that aa probationer
206. Cf United
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
U.S. 112, 119-20 (2001)
probationer has aa
to police
police searches,
privacy, with
with respect
respect to
lesser expectation
of privacy,
lesser
expectation of
searches, than
than an ordinary citizen). But
But aa criminal
rival gang
gang or
that he
being attacked
attacked by
may also
be more
more likely
likely toto think
he isis being
by aa rival
or other
other criminals.
criminals. No-Knock
think that
may
also be
7, 2007,
2007, available
at 2007
(Ga.), Aug.
Aug. 7,
Search Warrants:
MACON TEL. (Ga.),
available at
Benefits, MACON
Search
Warrants: Weighing
Weighing Risks vs. Benefits,
supranote 16, at 32.
BALKO, supra
WLNR 15103314; see also BALKO,
756, 758 (2d
207. Cf United States v.
v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756,758
(2d Cir. 1976) (holding that, with respect
respect to the
is an
articulable fact
area for
for criminal
criminal activity
activity is
reasonableness
of an
an articulable
"[t]he reputation
reputation of
an area
of a
a police
police stop,
stop, "[t]he
reasonableness of
legitimately rely").
rely").
a police
police officer
officer may
upon which
which a
upon
may legitimately
208.
208. This is not to propose
propose eliminating no-knock
no-knock entries altogether. Police may sufficiently surprise
before,
during, not before,
without provoking
deadly reaction by
the occupant
the
occupant without
provoking aa deadly
by making their presence
presence known during,
A person awakened to
entry. A
to the sound of loudspeakers
loudspeakers and sirens is not likely to think that robbers are
criminals would
would probably
probably not
invading; real
invading;
real criminals
not want to
to announce themselves to
to the whole neighborhood.
ANN. § 16-3-23(1)(2007).
16-3-23(1) (2007).
209.
209. GA. CODE ANN.
supra note 183.
183.
supranote 187; see also
also Long,
210. See Simmons,
Simmons, supra
Long, supra
BALKO,supra
211. See BALKO,
supra note 16, at 41-42 (advocating tighter search warrant standards).
of
311 (Colo.
(Colo. 1995)
1995) (saying that Colorado's defense of
892 P.2d
P.2d 304,
304, 311
212.
People v.
v. McNeese,
McNeese, 892
212. Cf People
"encourage arbitrary, casual killings").
habitation statute was not meant to "encourage
habitation
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unlawfulness of the entry would ensure that home
standard as to the unlawfulness
dwellers do not get punished
reasonably and that only the
punished for acting reasonably
most culpable
culpable individuals
individuals wind up in prison or on death row.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

"Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright or
"Innocent
' 213
police intrusion.
embarrassment
embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced
unannounced police
intrusion.,,213
But the deterioration
requirement makes
deterioration of the knock-and-announce
knock-and-announce requirement
214
no-knock raids
conduct
lawfully
to
enforcement
law
for
easier
it
enforcement to lawfully conduct no-knock
raids 214
and increases the risk of deadly encounters between
between police
police and
2
15
citizens. Like the story of Kathryn Johnston has shown, even lawcitizens?15
abiding civilians may not surrender
surrender without a fight when strangers
216 As killings tend to
invite criminal
violently break into their homes. 216
charges, Georgia's defense of habitation statute may offer a critical
legal defense to occupants who use deadly force against police upon
217 The key question is whether, under the
robbers.217
mistaking them for robbers.
statute, the intruder's
intruder's entry must actually be unlawful, or whether the
occupant
may
shoot upon reasonable belief that the entry is
occupant
218
unlawful. 218
answer,2 1 9
clear answer,219
provide aa clear
Though the statutory text alone does
does not
not provide
instruments
instruments of textual interpretation
interpretation are consistent with the
proposition that the occupant
occupant need only reasonably believe
believe that the
22
0
entry is unlawful. 220 Further, an exploration of relevant case law
shows that Georgia allows its residents to defend
defend themselves against
against
police
reasonably perceived threats, even if those threats appear in a police

(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
213. Ker
Ker v.v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57
57 (1963)
214. See BALKo,supra
BALKO, supranote
at 30.
214.
note 16,
16,at30.
215. Butler,
Butler, supra
supra note
note 22, at 453.
216. See discussion
discussion supra
supra INTRODUCTION.
iNTRODUCTION.
217. See discussion supra
supra Part I.B;
LB; see also
also Balko,
supranote
Balko, supra
note 16,
16, at 35 ("[Occupants]
("[Occupants] who
who have
have used
used
force
force toto defend themselves from improper
improper raids
raids have been prosecuted for
for criminal recklessness,
recklessness,
manslaughter,
manslaughter, and murder and have received sentences ranging
ranging from probation,
probation, to life
life inin prison, to the
the
death
penalty.").
death penalty.
").
218.
218. See discussion
discussion supra Part I.A.
II.A.
219. See discussion
discussion supra
supra Part B1.A.
II.A.
220. See discussion supra
l1.A.1-2.
supra Part II.A.1-2.
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2211
view to legal
legal precedent,
precedent, those
those few cases
cases
Finally, with a view
uniform. 22
of habitation
habitation to police
police encounters
encounters are
that have
have applied
applied defense
defense of
that
consistent with exculpating
exculpating an occupant
occupant who
who has
has a reasonable
reasonable
consistent
222
apprehension of
of danger.
danger.222
apprehension
Courts should interpret
interpret the defense
defense of habitation
habitation statute
statute to require
223
223
Otherwise, the
unlawfu1.
Otherwise,
only reasonable
reasonable belief that the entry
entry is unlawful.
224
224
occupant
cruel dilemma.
If
If he shoots,
shoots, he risks being
occupant faces a cruel
225
but if he waits to
charged with capital
capital murder
murder of
of a police
police officer,
officer,225
ascertain
the intruder's
intruder's identity, he exposes
exposes himself
himself to robbers or
or
ascertain the
226
226
police
police impersonators.
impersonators. Georgia
Georgia legislature
legislature certainly did not intend
intend
bestowed
the
protections
to
destroy
for such dreadful hesitation
hesitation
protections bestowed by
227
the statute?27
statute.
endanger officers
Requiring only reasonable
reasonable belief is not likely to endanger
Requiring
228
In fact, courts can promote
encourage thoughtless
thoughtless shootouts?28
shootouts.
or encourage
creating clear guidelines
guidelines as to what
more police caution and safety by creating
constitutes reasonable
reasonable belief of danger in an occupant. 229
229 Such
constitutes
guidelines will encourage
encourage officers
officers to consider the reasonable
reasonable
guidelines
apprehensions
apprehensions of the occupant before
before any no-knock raid, thereby
230 And if a tragedy does
avoiding a mistaken, but deadly reaction. 23o
avoiding
guidelines will ensure that any defendant's punishment
punishment is
occur, such guidelines
231
guilt."
moral
and
responsibility
"tailored to his personal
personal responsibility and moral guilt.,,231
"tailored

221.
222.
222.
223.
223.
224.
224.
225.
225.
226.
226.
227.
227.
228.
228.
229.
229.
230.
230.
231.
231.

supraPart II.B.
ll.B.
See discussion supra
supraPart II.C.
See discussion supra
II.C.
supraPart HI.
See discussion supra
III.
supraPart IHL.A-B.
See discussion supra
III.A-B.
supraPart III.A.
See discussion supra
supraPart /I.B.
See discussion supra
III.B.
supraPart II.A.3.
See discussion supra
II.A.3.
l/I.D.
supraPart III.D.
See discussion supra
lI.D.
supraPart III.D.
See discussion supra
llI.D.
supraPart III.D.
See discussion supra
See
supraPart IlI.D.
III.D.
also discussion supra
782, 801
801 (1982);
(1982); see also
458 U.S. 782,
Enmund v. Florida, 458

Published by Reading Room, 2010

31
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 615 2009-2010

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 5

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/5
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 616 2009-2010

32

